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ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Whether the Utah Uniform Mediation Act should in fact govern.
II. How the Utah Uniform Mediation Act affects the questions raised in this
appeal.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES. ORDINANCES, RULES, & REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3lb-1, et seq. - Addendum 1
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3lc-101 et seq. -- Addendum 2
Uniform Mediation Act, Final Version, with Prefatory Note and Comments, 2003,
Sections 3 and 6 - Addendum 3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This appeal involves an attorney, Ms. Acosta, who entered into a binding
agreement with Respondent Craig Reese on behalf of her client, Petitioner LWP.
LWP now denies having entered into this agreement, and has attempted to use
various confidentiality provisions, including the Utah Uniform Mediation Act, to
suppress evidence of the agreement.
The Act should not govern this issue because Craig Reese and LWP never
agreed to mediate, and their separate agreement was reached outside of the
mediation context.
By its express provision, the Act applies only to "agreements to mediate
whenever made." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3lc-114(2). While the parties to the
original lawsuit, Craig Reese and Tingey, created a written record of an agreement
to mediate, no such record exists between Craig Reese and LWP, who never had
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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an agreement to mediate. Mr. Dunn, counsel for LWP, essentially admitted this at
oral argument before this Court.
Nevertheless, a separate agreement between Craig Reese and LWP was
reached, apart from the mediation. Mr. Felt did not act as a mediator in this
separate agreement, nor did Tingey participate. Therefore the agreement falls
outside of the Act's definition of mediation, which is "a process in which a
mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them
in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute." Utah Code Ann. § 7831c-102(1). Mr. Felt did not facilitate this agreement, it was not part of the subject
matter of the mediation, and LWP was an interested spectator, not a party to the
mediation dispute. Instead, the agreement was a separate agreement which Craig
Reese relied upon to settle its mediation dispute with Tingey.
Despite the foregoing, if the Court finds that the Utah Uniform Mediation
Act does apply to this issue, at least four exceptions in the Act also apply which
would allow for disclosure of the relevant information. Since Craig Reese has not
yet had the opportunity to introduce evidence supporting these exceptions and the
existence of an agreement, this Court should remand to the district court to make
these determinations.
First, the broad exception test in § 7 8-3 lc-106(2) allows disclosure when a
court determines at a hearing that the evidence is not otherwise available, the need
for the evidence substantially outweighs the interest in confidentiality, and the
evidence is offered in a proceeding regarding a contract arising out of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mediation. Each of these three factors is met here. The only way to obtain this
evidence is through the testimony and affidavits of those present at the mediation.
There is also a need to uphold public policy favoring settlements, avoiding unjust
results, and obtaining reliable evidence which substantially outweighs the interest
in confidentiality in this case, especially considering that only a narrow range of
communications (those regarding the existence and terms of an agreement) need to
be disclosed. Where, as here, a party has relied upon a binding agreement to settle
its differences with another party, confidentiality must give way to allow evidence
of that agreement. Finally, the evidence is argued in a motion to enforce a binding
contract. Therefore this exception applies.
Second, § 78-31-107(2)(a) provides that a mediator may disclose "whether
a settlement was reached." Further, a mediator may testify as to any mediation
communications under the broad exception test mentioned above, which applies
here. This Section would thus permit mediator testimony here concerning the
existence of an agreement as well as its terms.
Third, the parties to the case, Craig Reese and Tingey, have already agreed
to disclose information concerning the settlement agreements, which under § 7831c-108 the parties have discretion to do. The parties have also been careful not to
disclose confidential information regarding liability, dollar amounts, or other
similarly privileged matters discussed in the mediation.
Fourth, under § 78-3 lc-105(2) LWP has already effectively waived its
confidentiality privileges concerning the agreement with Craig Reese in its
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
3 may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

arguments and affidavits attempting to "rebut" Craig Reese's recitations of the
facts in this case. Craig Reese will be prejudiced if LWP is allowed to disclose its
own version of events and invoke the confidentiality privilege to block Craig
Reese from responding to its claims.
In sum, this Court should affirm the district court's order allowing the
deposition of Ms. Acosta and remand to allow Craig Reese to introduce further
evidence, including affidavits and testimony of those present at the mediation.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE UTAH UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT SHOULD NOT GOVERN
HERE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT TO MEDIATE
BETWEEN CRAIG REESE AND LWP, AND BECAUSE THE
SETTLEMENT BETWEEN CRAIG REESE AND LWP WAS A
SEPARATE AGREEMENT,
A.

There Was No "Agreement to Mediate" Between Craig Reese
and LWP, Which Is Required for the Act to Apply.

The Utah Uniform Mediation Act ("the Act") should not govern here due to
there being no agreement to mediate between Craig Reese and LWP. As of May
1, 2007, the Act "governs all agreements to mediate whenever made." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-31c-l 14(2).
Section 78-3lc-103 of the Act, discussing the Act's "scope," provides some
insight into the definition of an "agreement to mediate." The section provides that
the Act applies when "the mediation parties and the mediator agree to mediate in a
record that demonstrates an expectation that mediation communications will be
privileged against disclosure" (emphasis added).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3lc-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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mediation conference on December 30, 2005, to promote amicable relations and
avoid litigation costs, 'jm* ujLicloa lurmally agreed in a record to mediate. R55;
R66 <•* I
There is no record of an agreement to mediate with LWP, however. Ms.
Acosta was present representing LWP as a lien holder. She was merely invited to
the mediation. di «:: • t : h z i si lbi ogation intei <

settlement proceeds and

nothing more. This interest was not in any wa}

.

I lit.1 I;msml

P"

I'h*•

mediation would have proceeded without her, as she had no obligation to be
present.
LWP ha s never aiip-dod 11 ml iiil: \ \ as pai I: of an agi eement tc mediate in 1:1: lis
case, and il i,s ioo lair (n» do so now

The Comment to the original U niforni

Mediation Act states thai "|a| laier note by one party that they agreed to mediate
w Mild ii<nil lonsiiluU1 a in'inml oi an ,if»rtviiinil In mediate.

,. inn

Act, Final Version, with Prefatory Note and Comments, 2UUJ, 9 (^
http://wwwdaw.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.pdf).
Iliiili; "Ill, i .I'in1i'nin ipirslioik'd aliMiil (Jus icquiremeiit l)y tins ( "oiuil at oral
w.^xxxuit on May 2, 200 7, Mr. Dunn, Counsel ioi i_ ^ : essentially
there had been no agreement to mediate between LWP ami Craig Reese. Oral
Argument R ecording, Reese v Tinnw
http://ww wjilioiifis guvA» <: ''..;,•.:

.

4.

, < li; - (available at
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B.

The Agreement Between Craig Reese and LWP Was a Separate
and Isolated Agreement Relied Upon by Craig Reese to Settle the
Lawsuit Between Craig Reese and Tingey.

Another reason the Utah Uniform Mediation Act does not apply here is that
the agreement between LWP and Craig Reese was an agreement separate and
isolated from the mediation. Utah Code Annotated § 78-3 lc-103(1) provides that
the Act "applies to a mediation . . ." (emphasis added). Mediation is defined as "a
process in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between
parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3lc-102(l).
Although LWP was present during the mediation, usually in the same room
as Craig Reese, its agreement with Craig Reese was not part of the dispute
between Craig Reese and Tingey regarding liability or other issues in the lawsuit.
Mr. Felt, the mediator, only mediated the agreement between the parties; he did
not facilitate the agreement between Craig Reese and LWP, though he did make
one phone call to LWP representatives to explain the mediation between Craig
Reese and Tingey. R55-57; R70; R77-78. LWP's only interest in the outcome of
the suit was its statutory subrogation interest in the amount received in settlement.
R55.
This subrogation interest was settled prior to and separate from the
agreement of the two parties to the mediation. There was no actual legal dispute
between Craig Reese and LWP, but an undisputed statutory lien requirement. See
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5). The reason Craig Reese invited LWP was to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

t a k e • :: a re c I I V "rI ''s lien

•* -

\

payment of all Craig Reese's wi v " j " anu immediate medical expenses and
compensation in return for the immediate payment of their full net lien and full
st/Kleiiiefil. V i

(

>K, H HI ' I

1 ni^u'y ,s alloiiK^s, although the separate agreement

allowed Craig Reese to accept their settlement offei , were not in any way in ( • oh e d
in the agreement with I W P . R77-78. The agreement with I ,'W'P was therefore
completely distinct from the mediation itself.

.,

•.

mediation. In its own words, L W P was merely an "Interested spectator" in the
case, R 2 1 3 . Further, its discussions with Craig Reese were not part of the actual

Craig Reese and L W P is thus necessarily separate from the proceedings of the
mediation and is not governed by the Act.
Also, as previously discussed in Respondent'' 's Brief on this issue, the Utah

reasons. See Brief of Respondent Murlyn Craig Reese, 19-22. The A D R Act
defines mediation as "a private forum in which one or more impartial persons
(jnlilitli: miminimt .limn In (v-crn fMilics In »n r n i ! n Ii 11 In pininuh
acceptable resolution or settlement."

m iiiiiliiall

"Utah Code Ann. § 78-31b-2v8,.

Ao

mentioned, the mediator, M r Felt, was not involved in facilitating communicate •
Itdwecii i "i;iij.» U rest: and I! \ \ T

RVi "n ", l>! Ml", U /"

\ini \ u x e Craig Rec^c an.,

L W P "parties to a civil action" as retpiiiTil in \hv A i i« -M l I iiii t l i n , 1111:: irvnlm< r
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was not offered and would never be necessary to offer "at any subsequent trial of
the same case or same issues between the same parties." Utah Code Ann. § 7831b-8(2).
II.

EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE UTAH UNIFORM
MEDIATION ACT DOES GOVERN, IT SHOULD AFFIRM THE
DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION AND REMAND, BECAUSE THE
CONFIDENTIALITY PRIVILEGE IS SUBJECT TO MANY
EXCEPTIONS.
There are many exceptions to the confidentiality privilege of the Act, many

of which apply here and would allow disclosure of information necessary to
establish an agreement between Craig Reese and LWP. If this Court does apply
the Utah Uniform Mediation Act to this case, it should affirm the district court's
order and remand to allow Craig Reese to introduce evidence to determine whether
these exceptions apply. At the time the parties created their Motion to Enforce, the
Act did not apply, and so the parties did not have a chance to introduce evidence to
meet these exceptions.
Further, the Motion to Enforce was not fully argued before the district court
due to the interlocutory appeal to this Court. Therefore, this Court must remand so
Craig Reese may introduce evidence such as Ms. Acosta's deposition, the
testimony of Mr. Henriksen's secretary, and subsequent affidavits. R213, May 22,
2006 Hearing Transcript, 39-40.
Though the facts of Lyons v. Booker do not apply here, the principle that an
appeals court "does not hear or consider new evidence" applies to this Court as
well as other appeals courts. 1999 UT App 172, f 2, 982 P.2d 1143. The district
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

under the evidence already introduced, there is moi \lu:\ ^uliicient likelihood that
these exceptions are met here, as will be shown... hii.s < ourt should therefore, if it
drtH'fiinies iilillijil llin Ai, I ill»|>1K\->. allnm the dislrul

iiiiiitl s oidci .inil n maud In

allow Craig Reese to offer further evidence to establish these exceptions to
confidentiality under the Act as well as the existence of an agreement with LWP.
A.

The Confidentiality Privilege liues INot Apply Where the
Evidence is Not Otherwise Available, There Is a Need to
Introduce the Evidence Which Substantially Outweighs the
Privilege, and. the Evidence Is Offered in a Proceeding to
Enforce a Contract.

A broad excepik... -> UJi ^vWiiiuaiihihu pn *•..£. known, as the "exception
test,"1 is state

rah Code >'

;

"There -.onlidentialiivi privilege • * *»*irt, administrative
agenc} o< arbitrate finds ;nic? \ hearing !•- ^ amera, that the party
seeking discover} *'i ihc pioponent« ' evidence has shown that:
(a) the evidence is not otherwise
.. jhi,
(b) there is a need for the evidence that s 1111 s 1.111 (i a 11)' u 111 w e i ^ 11i 1111 •
interest in protecting confidentiality; and
(c) the mediation communication is sought or offered in:
(ii)
, a proceeding to prove a claim 10 rescind 01 reforn. *
i
defense to avoid '
^ or \ *i nat msin« ^ui ^'
2
mediation." .
Because the validity of a settlement agreement is a vital issue, (he drat Ins

! llic

Uniform Mediation Act included this exception test, which is "broader" than otliei

1

See Lelir v. Afflilo, 889 A 2d 462, 475 (NJ. Super, Ct App Div. 2006).

2 if this t e s t j S m e t 5 § 78 3 | c .jo 7(2)(j») provides Ihul a mediator may also
testify concerning these communications.
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exceptions, to allow evidence establishing such an agreement. Uniform Mediation
Act, Final Version, with Prefatory Note and Comments, 2003, 33. Each of the
factors of the exception test applies here, and the Court should thus remand to
allow this evidence.
1.

The evidence of an agreement with LWP is not available
except through the testimony and affidavits Craig Reese
seeks to introduce.

Evidence of the binding agreement between LWP and Craig Reese is only
available through the testimony or affidavits of those who were present during the
formulation of the agreement.

Mr. Felt prepared a written memorandum of

understanding which encompassed this separate agreement as well as the
mediation agreement between Craig Reese and Tingey, but Ms. Acosta refused to
sign it. R59;R71-72;R78.
Since Ms. Acosta, after earlier assenting to the agreement, did not sign the
written memorandum of understanding, further evidence is required to establish
that she had unequivocally agreed to the agreement before attempting to back out
of it. R59; R71-72; R78. This evidence is only available through those persons
who witnessed her assent to this agreement, and through her own deposition.
2.

There is a strong need for the evidence of the existence of
the agreement that in this circumstance substantially
outweighs the interest in confidentiality.

There is a strong need for evidence here which substantially outweighs the
confidentiality interest. The Comment to the original Uniform Mediation Act
recognizes this need, stating that "confidentiality agreements reached in mediation,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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enforced fc i p: i it lie policj reasons fm coring settlement, reliable evidence, and
performance of contractual duties. These reasons need to be balanced against the
interest in confidentiality rather than being supplanted b) ' it.

,• .

the validity of a settlement agreement was at issue, This Court should use the
reasoning applied by the court in Sharon Motor Lodge Inc. v. Tai, a recent case in,..
v hich a pai t) assented to a mediation agn
tjie

- «

agreement's existence. 2006 WL 696320 (Conn. 5upci. d , = ( - ^ attached a^

Addendum. 4).
In Shai on Motoi Lodge, the pai tie .s disagreed on the existence of a
S

l i

. -

•

determination, which wab granted, and tlien a motion w alkm Uv Jepovhon o*
mediator. The defendant opposed the motion on. the grounds of confidentiality
in! ,il

l

J" 'i

a r l e x c e pj-| 0 I 1

Hit i iiiiii liiftinii In the < n n n u h u l l ( i r n n . i l Slaluli's \\ liiu'li MIHII.IIII1

strikingly similar to the exception test.

See

C.G.SJ L

§ 52-

235d(b)(4) 3 In fact, the court in its holding referenced the I Jniform,.. Mediation

3

" Fhe Connecticut statute provides that a "par li
not voluntarily disclose or, through discovery or comj

it in a me liati :: n shall
rv nrocess, be i eqi lire d
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Act's exception test itself, noting that it was analogous to its own statute. Sharon
Motor Lodge, 2006 WL 696320, at *9.
The Sharon Motor Lodge court found that the exception did apply, because
"it is arguable that the plaintiffs have a substantial need to elicit testimony of the
mediator in order to obtain evidence," and it was apparent that "evidence regarding
. . . this issue is not available from other, unprivileged sources." Id. at *10. Thus
the court ruled that "[i]n these circumstances, the interest of justice outweighs the
need for confidentiality." M a t * 11.
In Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., the issue was whether to allow
testimony from a mediator to determine the enforceability of an agreement. 68 F.
Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (D. Cal. 1999). The court considered, among other policy
concerns, the interest in "doing justice," or in other words, "improving] the
court's ability to determine reliability what the pertinent historical facts actually
were." Id. at 1136. The court also considered that the testimony "would provide
the court with the evidentiary confidence it needs to enforce the agreement," while
refusing to admit the testimony "might well deprive the court of the evidentiary
confidence it needs to enforce the agreement."

Id. at 1137. The court thus

concluded that the importance of these policy concerns outweighed the interest in
confidentiality and allowed the mediator to testify. Id.

circumstances in which a court finds that the interest of justice outweighs the need
for confidentiality, consistent with the principles of law" (emphasis added).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Commentators have also agreed that the contract principles of reliance and
settlement should be taken into account when deciding a novel issue like the one in
the instant case. This position is taken by Peter Robinson in a recent journal article
regarding the Uniform Mediation Act. Centuries of Contract Common Law Can yt
Be All Wrong: Why the UMA's Exception to Mediation Confidentiality in
Enforcement Proceedings Should be Embraced and Broadened, 2003 J. Disp.
Resol. 135, 171.
Robinson notes that failure to respect contract law and instead requiring
strict confidentiality in all communications, as LWP suggests this Court do, will
lead to "absurd enforcement results." Id. at 142. Examples cited by Robinson
include cases in which a party used fraud or duress during mediation settlement, or
agreed to terms and then later changed them, and then relied on the confidentiality
of mediation communications to suppress evidence of its improper behavior. Id. at
143-48.
Robinson praises the Act for being an "improvement for strict mediation
confidentiality jurisdictions because it explicitly acknowledges that, at times,
mediation confidentiality must defer." Id. at 168. Concerning the exception test,
he also notes that "while some commentators have expressed concern about [the
requirement that the need for the evidence substantially outweigh the interest in
confidentiality], it should not be problematic in the context of enforcing a settled
case . . . Courts have already noted that the interest in protecting mediation
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confidentiality is diminished in the context of enforcing a mediated agreement."
M a t 168-69.
In the instant case it is clear that public policy principles are applicable, and
that the same principles discussed by commentators and the Olam and Sharon
Motor Lodge courts are implicated. Craig Reese relied heavily on the agreement
with LWP to settle his lawsuit with Tingey. R57. With evidence allowing the
parties to enforce this agreement, this long and costly litigation will come to an
end with the parties settling out of court. Without the evidence, both parties will
be back to square one. More importantly, LWP will be allowed to back out of an
agreement to which it had already bound itself, which would be an absurd and
unjust result, as well as a gross disregard of contract principles.
Likewise, as the court discussed in Olam, allowing evidence of this
agreement will further the interest in allowing a court to do justice and have
evidentiary confidence in making its determination. It is vital to know what the
facts actually were regarding the agreement between Craig Reese and LWP, and
the only way for the district court to know is to admit evidence of the settlement's
existence. Failure to do so would hinder the ability of the court to confidently
make a correct determination on the issue.
Balancing the needs for disclosure of evidence of this settlement agreement
against the need for confidentiality, it is clear that the balance in this case should
fall on the side of disclosure. The only evidence required to be disclosed here is of
a non-confidential nature, establishing the existence of an agreement and its
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essential terms. This information will not affect the liability or credibility of
parties to the lawsuit. The lawsuit will be highly affected, however, if LWP is
allowed to block evidence of its agreement with Craig Reese. Public policy should
prevail and this agreement should be enforced if Craig Reese introduces evidence
to the district court supporting its existence.
3.

The parties are seeking to enforce a separate contract
made at the mediation via their Joint Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement, which LWP is opposing.

This issue arises out of a Joint Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement
filed by Craig Reese and Tingey, and so involves a binding contract on which
LWP is trying to avoid liability. Karen Hobbs, a well-known Utah mediator, noted
in a recent article that § 106(2)(c)(ii) would contemplate this exact situation.
Mediation Confidentiality and Enforceable Settlements: Deal or No Deal?, Utah
Bar Journal, May/June 2007, 40. Further, the Comment to the original Uniform
Mediation Act itself states: "This exception [test] . . . is broader in that it would
permit the admissibility of other mediation communications that are necessary to
establish or refute a defense to the validity of a mediated settlement agreement"
(emphasis added). Uniform Mediation Act, Final Version, with Prefatory Note and
Comments, 2003, 33.
4.

The instant case is unique and presents a stronger basis
for applying the exception test than cases in other
jurisdictions which have applied the Act

Since the Uniform Mediation Act is relatively new, there are very few cases
from any jurisdictions discussing exceptions to confidentiality under the Act. In
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the case that have dealt with these exceptions, none presented evidence that gave a
good basis for the exceptions to apply. Those cases are thus distinguishable from
the instant case, where there is a strong basis for applying the exception test.
In Lehr v. Afflito, the parties met with a mediator who after the mediation
wrote a letter of understanding to the parties' counsel setting forth in detail the
issues resolved at the mediation. 889 A.2d 462, 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2006).

The lower court allowed this testimony from the mediator, but the

appellate court reversed, using the Uniform Mediation Act as a guiding principle.
Id. at 472-74. The court found that the need for the mediator's testimony did not
outweigh the confidentiality interest under the exception test, and was therefore
impermissible. Id. at 475.
The instant case is easily distinguishable from Lehr. In Lehr, the mediator's
testimony was not vital because "it was clear and undisputed that an agreement
had not been reached as to all issues." Id. There had been several financial issues
unresolved in the mediation. Id. Further, Lehr was a divorce case, and "financial
issues in a matrimonial case are, by their nature, interrelated." Id. The fact that
several financial issues remained unresolved, therefore, was clear evidence that no
agreement was reached.

Also, the mediator's testimony went beyond just

establishing the existence of an agreement; it mentioned details of the settlement
between the parties. Id. at 464.
Here, however, it is clear that the settlement between Craig Reese and LWP
was an agreement on all issues when taken in conjunction with the settlement
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between Craig Reese and Tingey. R56-57; R70; R77-78. Further, no testimony
would be needed here regarding the subject matter of the lawsuit, only relating to
an agreement between Craig Reese and LWP. This is therefore a much stronger
case under the exception test than Lehr.
Another easily distinguishable case is Adessa v. Adessa, another instance
where mediator testimony was not permitted. 919 A.2d 885 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2007). In Adessa a trial judge compelled a mediator to testify regarding a
property settlement agreement reached in mediation. The appellate court reversed
this order. Id.
The instant case provides a much stronger argument for the exception test
than Adessa.

First, the mediation agreement in Adessa between the parties

specifically provided that neither party was to depose or subpoena the mediator.
Id. at 890-91.

Second, the trial judge had compelled, not just allowed, the

mediator's testimony, which is strictly prohibited by the Uniform Mediation Act in
such a circumstance. Id. at 891; see Utah Code Ann. § 78-31c-106(3).
Here, in contrast, the mediator is not being compelled to testify, and most of
the evidence Craig Reese sought to introduce was not mediator testimony
anyway—it was the depositions and testimony of others. Therefore, Adessa does
not govern the instant case.
The instant case presents a unique set of circumstances where the interest of
justice must prevail. While the Uniform Mediation Act's exception test discussed
in Lehr and Adessa is the test used here, the facts here differ significantly from the
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facts in those cases. The situation here is most like the one in Sharon Motor
Lodge, where the court used a similar exception under its own statute to permit the
introduction of evidence relating to a mediation settlement agreement. The unique
facts here meet the requirements of the exception test, and under the Uniform
Mediation Act this Court should therefore affirm and remand the issue for the
lower court to hold a hearing to rule on the exception test as it applies to these
facts.
B.

The Act Provides that Mediators May Testify Concerning the
Existence of An Agreement, as Well as the Terms of That
Agreement,

When establishing the existence of an agreement, the Act specifically
allows for mediator testimony.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-107(2), a

mediator may disclose "(a) whether the mediation occurred or has terminated,
whether a settlement was reached, and attendance; (b) a mediation communication
as permitted under Section 78-31 c-106" (emphasis added).
Under subsection (a), the confidentiality privilege does not extend to
mediator testimony concerning the existence of settlement agreements. If the
agreement between Craig Reese and LWP was a settlement agreement under the
Act, it is not privileged and may be disclosed by the mediator pursuant to this
Section.
Other courts have agreed with this provision of the Act. For instance, in
Riner v. Newbraugh, the court held that "a mediator can be called to testify to the
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generalized issue of whether an agreement has been reached." 563 S.E.2d 802, 808
(W.Va.2002).
However, the Act goes even further than this in subsection (b), allowing the
mediator to testify to other mediation communications if an exception under § 7831c-106 applies. As discussed supra in Part II.A, the exception test in § 106(2)
does apply here. Therefore the Act would allow mediator testimony here as to not
only the existence of an agreement, but the terms of the agreement as well.
In Few v. Hammock Enters, Inc., 132 N.C. App. 291 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999),
the parties had come to an agreement "on all issues," and all that remained was the
execution by the parties' signatures. The defendants, however, refused to sign the
settlement agreement. The plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce, and the defendants
cited confidentiality privileges to bar introduction of the agreement. Id. at 293.
The court ruled that a mediator may "testify or produce evidence on whether the
parties reached a settlement agreement, and as to the terms of the agreement." Id.
at 291.
The facts of the instant case are very similar to those in Few. LWP and
Craig Reese had come to an agreement on all issues, and the only thing that
remained was for LWP to sign the agreement, which it refused to do. R59; R7172; R78. The mediator, Mr. Felt, argued to Ms. Acosta that the agreement was
final and had been relied upon by Craig Reese in its agreement with Tingey. R59;
R71-72; R78. Yet LWP is now attempting to use confidentiality to bar evidence of
this agreement.

This Court should adopt the reasoning of the Few court in
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allowing testimony regarding the existence and essential terms of that agreement,
particularly since the Uniform Mediation Act has specifically granted this
exception.
C.

The Parties to the Lawsuit, Craig Reese and Tingey, Have
Already Agreed to Disclose Some Communications Which Show
the Existence and Essential Terms of a Settlement Agreement.

The parties have decided the extent to which they will disclose mediation
communications, and have carefully done so to avoid any communications
regarding liability or private matters. Utah Code Annotated § 78-31c-108 states
that "mediation communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the
parties or provided by other law or rule of this state" (emphasis added). Utah
Code Annotated § 78-31c-103(3) provides: "If the parties agree in advance in a
signed record, or a record of proceeding reflects agreement by the parties, that all
or part of a mediation is not privileged, the privileges under Sections 78-3 lc-104
through 78-3lc-106 do not apply to the mediation or part agreed upon" (emphasis
added).
The record of proceeding here reflects a clear agreement by the parties to
disclose the existence and terms of a settlement agreement between Craig Reese
and LWP. In the parties' Joint Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, they
disclosed facts regarding the agreement. R56-59. Also, Mr. Henriksen and Mr.
Minnock, counsel for the parties, voluntarily disclosed information regarding the
agreement in their supporting Affidavits. R72; R78. The information provided in
the Joint Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and its accompanying affidavits
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regarding this settlement agreement was agreed upon by the parties and is
therefore not privileged.
The parties have been careful in the proceedings below not to disclose any
mediation communications other than those establishing an agreement was reached
and its essential terms. They have not disclosed confidential information regarding
liability, dollar amounts, or specific mediation discussions. R54-79. In their Joint
Motion to Enforce, the parties note that "the specific statements or comments
made during the mediation need not be set forth here." R56.
The district court allowed the parties to distinguish between specific,
confidential information, and information simply disclosing an agreement and its
terms. Judge Kouris, in the hearing on May 22, 2006, held that "the specifics of
the case, that potentially could open liability to either side, has got to remain under
absolute confidentiality. . . None of that stuff's been discussed. The only part
that's been discussed was, do we have an agreement? Yes, we do. I agree. No, I
don't agree. Those are the kind of things we're talking about." R213, May 22,
2006 Hearing Transcript, 31.
Judge Kouris also ruled, however, that the parties were permitted to
disclose "conversations and agreements that were made" during the mediation. Id.
at 45. He then directed the parties to "conduct a deposition [of Ms. Acosta]
accordingly." Id. This Court should affirm this order and allow Craig Reese to
take Ms. Acosta's limited deposition and introduce other evidence according to the
limits set forth by the judge.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

D.

In Its Affidavits and Arguments Preceding This Appeal, LWP
Has Already Effectively Waived Its Confidentiality Privileges
Regarding the Agreement with Craig Reese.

LWP has already effectively waived its right to confidentiality regarding
disclosure of information pertaining to the settlement agreement.

Utah Code

Annotated § 78-31c-105(2) states that "[a] person that discloses or makes a
representation about a mediation communication which prejudices another person
in a proceeding is precluded from asserting a privilege under Section 78-3 lc-104 .
.. to the extent necessary for the person prejudiced to respond to the representation
or disclosure."
Ms. Acosta, in her affidavits, makes "representations about mediation
communications" which prejudice Craig Reese and thus waive the confidentiality
privilege as to those representations. In Ms. Acosta's Affidavit attached to LWP's
Opposition to Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement dated March 7, 2006, and
in her subsequent Affidavit dated May 22, 2006, Ms. Acosta makes specific
representations about the negotiations between LWP and Craig Reese in order to
deny the existence of a binding agreement. Among other things, Ms. Acosta
specifically denies the following: that she was "trying to reason with [my] client
and explaining to them it was too late to change their mind"; that there was to be a
waiver of the statutory offset for future medical and compensation payments; and
that there was an agreement to reduce LWP's lien. She also states that: "no other
concessions were ever made nor requested. It was never mentioned . . ."; "at no
time . . . did Mr. Henriksen ask me if LWP was willing to waive its statutory
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right"; and "at no time did we discuss the issue of when LWP's obligation to pay
medical payments would resume." R128-131; R132-133.
LWP likewise makes a representation about mediation communications in
three pages of its Reply to Respondent's Brief (Sections II.C and II.D), in an
attempt to "rebut" Craig Reese's Statement of Facts in his original Brief. For
instance, LWP specifically discusses the agreement provision that LWP waive its
requirement that Craig Reese exhaust funds prior to LWP's continued medical
payments. LWP claims that this term was never discussed between the parties.
See Reply Brief of Real Party-in-Interest and Petitioner, LWP Solutions, Inc., 4, 711.
LWP cannot claim that its responses and affidavits should not be viewed by
the Court as a waiver of the confidentiality proceedings. This might be the case if
LWP were compelled and required to disclose these details, but the fact is that
neither the district court nor this Court have required LWP to disclose anything.
LWP prepared its affidavits and included these details without anyone asking it to
do so. Judge Kouris, during the hearing held on May 22, 2006, even noted that it
was "inconsistent" for LWP to claim confidentiality on one hand and then present
a prepared affidavit with the other. R213; May 22, 2006 Hearing Transcript, 43.
LWP disclosed its version of the facts completely voluntarily and free of coercion,
despite its attempts to argue otherwise.
These representations concerning the communications will certainly
"prejudice" Craig Reese if he does not have the opportunity to respond with his
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own evidence. It would be unjust to allow LWP's side of the story regarding the
settlements reached at the mediation and to bar Craig Reese from telling his side.
In Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, discussed supra, the court noted that "it would
not serve the policy considerations of encouraging settlement by mediation or the
policy favoring disclosure if a party was able to use mediation proceedings to
engage in behavior that is prejudicial to the rights of other parties and then use the
mediation privilege to insulate himself or herself from liability." 2006 WL 696320,
at*ll.
LWP cannot argue this case on the merits and then retreat to its supposed
fortress of confidentiality hoping to suppress any opposing arguments. It must
choose one route or the other.

Since it has already chosen to argue through

discussion of mediation communications that there was no settlement agreement or
discussions of the waiver of the statutory offset, Craig Reese must have the
opportunity to respond. Therefore, the Court should rule that LWP has waived its
confidentiality privilege, and remand so Craig Reese may introduce evidence to
the extent necessary to establish the essential terms of the agreement, and refute
LWP's claim that no agreement was reached.
CONCLUSION
While Respondent Craig Reese argues the Utah Uniform Mediation Act
should not apply to this issue, even if this Court finds that it does apply, the facts
of this case fit under many of the confidentiality exceptions outlined in the Act
which allow for disclosure of evidence of an agreement. Craig Reese therefore
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respectfully requests that this court affirm the lower court's holding allowing
discovery and admission of evidence of an agreement between LWP and Craig
Reese, including the limited deposition of Ms. Acosta and affidavits of those
present, and remand to the lower court to determine whether an agreement was
reached.

DATED this J_

day of3(Jt&

2007.

tichard Henriksen, Jr.
Robert M. Henriksen
Henriksen & Henriksen, P.C.
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
Murlyn Craig Reese
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78-31b-l. Title.
This act is known as the "Alternative Dispute Resolution Act."
78-31b-2. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "ADR" means alternative dispute resolution and includes arbitration, mediation, and
other means of dispute resolution, other than court trial, authorized by the Judicial Council under
this chapter.
(2) "ADR organization" means an organization which provides training for ADR
providers or offers other ADR services.
(3) "ADR provider" means a neutral person who conducts an ADR procedure. An
arbitrator, mediator, and early neutral evaluator are ADR providers. An ADR provider may be
an employee of the court or an independent contractor.
(4) "Arbitration" means a private hearing before a neutral or panel of neutrals who hear
the evidence, consider the contentions of the parties, and enter a written award to resolve the
issues presented pursuant to Section 78-3 lb-6.
(5) "Award" as used in connection with arbitration includes monetary or equitable relief
and may include damages, interest, costs, and attorneys' fees.
(6) "Civil action" means an action in which a party seeks monetary or equitable relief at
common law or pursuant to statute.
(7) "Early neutral evaluation" means a confidential meeting with a neutral expert to
identify the issues in a dispute, explore settlement, and assess the merits of the claims.
(8) "Mediation" means a private forum in which one or more impartial persons facilitate
communication between parties to a civil action to promote a mutually acceptable resolution or
settlement.
(9) "Summary jury trial" means a summary presentation of a case to a jury which results
in a nonbinding verdict.
78-31b-3. Purpose and findings.
(1) The purpose of this act is to offer an alternative or supplement to the formal
processes associated with a court trial and to promote the efficient and effective operation of the
courts of this state by authorizing and encouraging the use of alternative methods of dispute
resolution to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of civil actions filed in the
courts of this state.
(2) The Legislature finds that:
(a) the use of alternative methods of dispute resolution authorized by this act will secure
the purposes of Article I, Section 11, Utah Constitution, by providing supplemental or
complementary means for the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of disputes;
(b) preservation of the confidentiality of ADR procedures will significantly aid the
successful resolution of civil actions in a just, speedy, and inexpensive manner;
(c) ADR procedures will reduce the need for judicial resources and the time and expense
of the parties;
(d) mediation has, in pilot programs, resulted in the just and equitable settlement of
petitions for the protection of children under Section 78-3a-305 and petitions for the terminations
of parental rights under Section 78-3a-405; and
(e) the purpose of this act will be promoted by authorizing the Judicial Council to
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establish rules to promote the use of ADR procedures by the courts of this state as an alternative
or supplement to court trial.
78-31b-4. Dispute Resolution Programs -- Director -- Duties -- Report
(1) Within the Administrative Office of the Courts, there shall be a director of Dispute
Resolution Programs, appointed by the state court administrator.
(2) The director shall be an employee of the Administrative Office of the Courts and
shall be responsible for the administration of all court-annexed Dispute Resolution Programs.
The director shall have duties, powers, and responsibilities as the Judicial Council may
determine. The qualifications for employment of the director shall be based on training and
experience in the management, principles, and purposes of alternative dispute resolution
procedures.
(3) In order to implement the purposes of this act, the Administrative Office of the
Courts may employ or contract with ADR providers or ADR organizations on a case-by-case
basis, on a service basis, or on a program basis. ADR providers and organizations shall be
subject to the rules and fees set by the Judicial Council. The Administrative Office of the Courts
shall establish programs for training ADR providers and orienting attorneys and their clients to
ADR programs and procedures.
(4) An ADR provider is immune from all liability when conducting proceedings under
the rules of the Judicial Council and the provisions of this act, except for wrongful disclosure of
confidential information, to the same extent as a judge of the courts in this state.
(5) The director shall report annually to the Supreme Court, the Judicial Council, the
Judiciary Interim Committee, the governor, and the Utah State Bar on the operation of the
Dispute Resolution Programs.
(a) Copies of the report shall be available to the public at the Administrative Office of
the Courts.
(b) The report shall include:
(i) identification of participating judicial districts and the methods of alternative dispute
resolution that are available in those districts;
(ii) the number and types of disputes received;
(iii) the methods of alternative dispute resolution to which the disputes were referred;
(iv) the course of the referral;
(v) the status of cases referred to alternative dispute resolution or the disposition of these
disputes; and
(vi) any problems encountered in the administration of the program and the
recommendations of the director as to the continuation or modification of any program.
(c) Nothing may be included in a report which would impair the privacy or
confidentiality of any specific ADR proceeding.
78-31b-5. Judicial Council rules for ADR procedures.
(1) To promote the use of ADR procedures, the Judicial Council may by rule establish
experimental and permanent ADR programs administered by the Administrative Office of the
Courts under the supervision of the director of Dispute Resolution Programs.
(2) The rules of the Judicial Council shall be based upon the purposes and provisions of
this act. Any procedural and evidentiary rules as the Supreme Court may adopt shall not impinge
on the constitutional rights of any parties.
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(3) The rules of the Judicial Council shall include provisions:
(a) to orient parties and their counsel to the ADR program, ADR procedures, and the
rules of the Judicial Council;
(b) to identify types of civil actions that qualify for ADR procedures;
(c) to refer to ADR procedures all or particular issues within a civil action;
(d) to protect persons not parties to the civil action whose rights may be affected in the
resolution of the dispute;
(e) to ensure that no party or its attorney is prejudiced for electing, in good faith, not to
participate in an optional ADR procedure;
(f) to exempt any case from the ADR program in which the objectives of ADR would not
be realized;
(g) to create timetables to ensure that the ADR procedure is instituted and completed
without undue delay or expense;
(h) to establish the qualifications of ADR providers for each form of ADR procedure
including that:
(i) an ADR provider may, but need not be, a certified ADR provider pursuant to Title 58,
Chapter 39a, Alternative Dispute Resolution Providers Certification Act; and
(ii) formal education in any particular field may not, by itself, be either a prerequisite or
sufficient qualification to serve as an ADR provider under the program authorized by this act;
(i) to govern the conduct of each type of ADR procedure, including the site at which the
procedure is conducted;
(j) to establish the means for the selection of an ADR provider for each form of ADR
procedure;
(k) to determine the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the ADR provider for each
form of ADR procedure;
(1) to establish a code of ethics applicable to ADR providers with means for its
enforcement;
(m) to protect and preserve the privacy and confidentiality of ADR procedures;
(n) to protect and preserve the privacy rights of the persons attending the ADR
procedures;
(0) to permit waiver of all or part of fees assessed for referral of a case to the ADR
program on a showing of impecuniosity or other compelling reason;
(p) to authorize imposition of sanctions for failure of counsel or parties to participate in
good faith in the ADR procedure assigned;
(q) to assess the fees to cover the cost of compensation for the services of the ADR
provider and reimbursement for the provider's allowable, out-of-pocket expenses and
disbursements; and
(r) to allow vacation of an award by a court as provided in Section 78-31a-124.
(4) The Judicial Council may, from time to time, limit the application of its ADR rules to
particular judicial districts.
78-31b-6. Minimum procedures for arbitration.
(1) An award in an arbitration proceeding shall be in writing and, at the discretion of the
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators, may state the reasons or otherwise explain the nature or amount
of the award.
(2) The award shall be final and enforceable as any other judgment in a civil action,
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unless:
(a) within 30 days after the filing of the award with the clerk of the court; any party files
with the clerk of court a demand for a trial de novo upon which the case shall be returned to the
trial calendar; or
(b) any party files with the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators and serves a copy on all other
parties a written request to modify the award on the grounds:
(i) there is an evident miscalculation of figures or description of persons or property
referred to in the award;
(ii) the award does not dispose of all the issues presented to the arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators for resolution; or
(iii) the award purports to resolve issues not submitted for resolution in the arbitration
process.
(c) The period for filing a demand for trial de novo is tolled until the arbitrator or panel
of arbitrators have acted on the request to modify the award, which must be completed within 30
days of the filing.
(3) The parties to an arbitration procedure may stipulate that:
(a) an award need not be filed with the court, except in those cases where the rights of
third parties may be affected by the provisions of the award; and
(b) the case is dismissed in which the award was made.
(4) (a) At any time the parties may enter into a written agreement for referral of the case
or of issues in the case to arbitration pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration
Act, or the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq., as the parties shall specify.
(b) The court may dismiss the case, or if less than all the issues are referred to arbitration,
stay the case for a reasonable period for the parties to complete a private arbitration proceeding.
78-31b-7. Minimum procedures for mediation.
(1) A judge or court commissioner may refer to mediation any case for which the Judicial
Council and Supreme Court have established a program or procedures. A party may file with the
court an objection to the referral which may be granted for good cause.
(2) (a) Unless all parties and the neutral or neutrals agree only parties, their
representatives, and the neutral may attend the mediation sessions.
(b) If the mediation session is pursuant to a referral under Subsection 78-3a-109(9), the
ADR provider or ADR organization shall notify all parties to the proceeding and any person
designated by a party. The ADR provider may notify any person whose rights may be affected by
the mediated agreement or who may be able to contribute to the agreement. A party may request
notice be provided to a person who is not a party.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), any settlement agreement between the
parties as a result of mediation may be executed in writing, filed with the clerk of the court, and
enforceable as a judgment of the court. If the parties stipulate to dismiss the action, any
agreement to dismiss shall not be filed with the court.
(b) With regard to mediation affecting any petition filed under Section 78-3a-305 or
78-3a-405:
(i) all settlement agreements and stipulations of the parties shall be filed with the court;
(ii) all timelines, requirements, and procedures described in Title 78, Chapter 3a, Parts 3
and 4, and in Title 62A, Chapter 4a, shall be complied with; and
(iii) the parties to the mediation may not agree to a result that could not have been
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ordered by the court in accordance with the procedures and requirements of Title 78, Chapter 3a,
Parts 3 and 4, and Title 62A, Chapter 4a.
78-31b-8. Confidentiality,
(1) ADR proceedings shall be conducted in a manner that encourages informal and
confidential exchange among the persons present to facilitate resolution of the dispute or a part of
the dispute. ADR proceedings shall be closed unless the parties agree that the proceedings be
open. ADR proceedings shall not be recorded.
(2) No evidence concerning the fact, conduct, or result of an ADR proceeding may be
subject to discovery or admissible at any subsequent trial of the same case or same issues
between the same parties.
(3) No party to the case may introduce as evidence information obtained during an ADR
proceeding unless the information was discovered from a source independent of the ADR
proceeding.
(4) Unless all parties and the neutral agree, no person attending an ADR proceeding,
including the ADR provider or ADR organization, may disclose or be required to disclose any
information obtained in the course of an ADR proceeding, including any memoranda, notes,
records, or work product.
(5) Except as provided, an ADR provider or ADR organization may not disclose or
discuss any information about any ADR proceeding to anyone outside the proceeding, including
the judge or judges to whom the case may be assigned. An ADR provider or an ADR
organization may communicate information about an ADR proceeding with the director for the
purposes of training, program management, or program evaluation and when consulting with a
peer. In making those communications, the ADR provider or ADR organization shall render
anonymous all identifying information.
(6) Nothing in this section limits or affects the responsibility to report child abuse or
neglect in accordance with Section 62A-4a-403.
(7) No records of ADR proceedings under this act or under Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah
Uniform Arbitration Act, shall be subject to Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access
and Management Act, except settlement agreements filed with the court after conclusion of an
ADR proceeding or awards filed with the court after the period for filing a demand for trial de
novo has expired.
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78-31c-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Utah Uniform Mediation Act."
78-31c-102. Definitions,
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Mediation" means a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and
negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their
dispute.
(2) "Mediation communication" means conduct or a statement, whether oral, in a record,
verbal, or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of considering,
conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a mediation or retaining a
mediator.
(3) "Mediation party" means a person that participates in a mediation and whose
agreement is necessary to resolve the dispute.
(4) "Mediator" means an individual who is neutral and conducts a mediation.
(5) "Nonparty participant" means a person, other than a party or mediator, that
participates in a mediation.
(6) "Person" means an individual, corporation, estate, trust, business trust, partnership,
limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(7) "Proceeding" means:
(a) a judicial, administrative, arbitral, or other adjudicative process, including related
prehearing and posthearing motions, conferences, and discovery; or
(b) a legislative hearing or similar process.
(8) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored
in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
(9) "Sign" means:
(a) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol with the present intent to authenticate a record;
or
(b) to attach or logically associate an electronic symbol, sound, or process to or with a
record with the present intent to authenticate a record.
78-31c-103. Scope.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2) or (3), this chapter applies to a
mediation in which:
(a) the mediation parties are required to mediate by statute, court, or administrative
agency rule or referred to mediation by a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator;
(b) the mediation parties and the mediator agree to mediate in a record that demonstrates
an expectation that mediation communications will be privileged against disclosure; or
(c) the mediation parties use as a mediator an individual who holds himself or herself out
as a mediator or the mediation is provided by an entity that holds itself out as providing
mediation.
(2) The chapter does not apply to a mediation:
(a) relating to the establishment, negotiation, administration, or termination of a
collective bargaining relationship;
(b) relating to a dispute that is pending under or is part of the processes established by a
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collective bargaining agreement, except that the chapter applies to a mediation arising out of a
dispute that has been filed with an administrative agency or court;
(c) conducted by a judge who might make a ruling on the case; or
(d) conducted under the auspices of:
(i) a primary or secondary school if all the parties are students; or
(ii) a correctional institution for youths if all the parties are residents of that institution.
(3) If the parties agree in advance in a signed record, or a record of proceeding reflects
agreement by the parties, that all or part of a mediation is not privileged, the privileges under
Sections 78-31c-104 through 78-31c-106 do not apply to the mediation or part agreed upon.
However, Sections 78-31c-104 through 78-31c-106 apply to a mediation communication made
by a person that has not received actual notice of the agreement before the communication is
made.
78-31c-104. Privilege against disclosure -- Admissibility -- Discovery.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-31c-106, a mediation communication is
privileged as provided in Subsection (2) and is not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence
in a proceeding unless waived or precluded as provided by Section 78-31c-105.
(2) In a proceeding, the following privileges apply:
(a) A mediation party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from
disclosing, a mediation communication.
(b) A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication, and may prevent any
other person from disclosing a mediation communication of the mediator.
(c) A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from
disclosing, a mediation communication of the nonparty participant.
(3) Evidence or information that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does not
become inadmissible or protected from discovery solely by reason of its disclosure or use in a
mediation.
78-31c-105. Waiver and preclusion of privilege.
(1) A privilege under Section 78-31c-104 may be waived in a record or orally during a
proceeding if it is expressly waived by all parties to the mediation, and:
(a) in the case of the privilege of a mediator, it is expressly waived by the mediator; and
(b) in the case of the privilege of a nonparty participant, it is expressly waived by the
nonparty participant.
(2) A person that discloses or makes a representation about a mediation communication
which prejudices another person in a proceeding is precluded from asserting a privilege under
Section 78-31c-104, but only to the extent necessary for the person prejudiced to respond to the
representation or disclosure.
(3) A person that intentionally uses a mediation to plan, attempt to commit or commit a
crime, or to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity is precluded from asserting a
privilege under Section 78-3 lc-104.
78-31c-106. Exceptions to privilege.
(1) There is no privilege under Section 78-31c-104 for a mediation communication that
is:
(a) in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the agreement;
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(b) available to the public under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and
Management Act, or made during a mediation session which is open, or is required by law to be
open, to the public;
(c) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a crime of violence;
(d) intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit or commit a crime, or to
conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity;
(e) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional
misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator;
(f) except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), sought or offered to prove or disprove
a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediation party,
nonparty participant, or representative of a party based on conduct occurring during a mediation;
or
(g) subject to the reporting requirements in Section 62A-3-305 or 62A-4a-403,
(2) There is no privilege under Section 78-31c-104 if a court, administrative agency, or
arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of the
evidence has shown that:
(a) the evidence is not otherwise available;
(b) there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting
confidentiality; and
(c) the mediation communication is sought or offered in:
(i) a court proceeding involving a felony or misdemeanor; or
(ii) except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), a proceeding to prove a claim to
rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.
(3) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication
referred to in Subsection (l)(f) or (2)(c)(ii).
(4) If a mediation communication is not privileged under Subsection (1) or (2), only the
portion of the communication necessary for the application of the exception from nondisclosure
may be admitted. Admission of evidence under Subsection (1) or (2) does not render the
evidence, or any other mediation communication, discoverable or admissible for any other
purpose.
78-31c-107. Prohibited mediator reports.
(1) Except as required in Subsection (2), a mediator may not make a report, assessment,
evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding a mediation to a court,
administrative agency, or other authority that may make a ruling on the dispute that is the subject
of the mediation.
(2) A mediator may disclose:
(a) whether the mediation occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement was reached,
and attendance;
(b) a mediation communication as permitted under Section 78-3 lc-106; or
(c) a mediation communication evidencing abuse, neglect, abandonment, or exploitation
of an individual to a public agency responsible for protecting individuals against such
mistreatment.
(3) A communication made in violation of Subsection (1) may not be considered by a
court, administrative agency, or arbitrator.
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78-31c-108. Confidentiality.
Unless subject to Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings Act, and Title 63,
Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act, mediation communications are
confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by other law or rule of this state.
78-31c-109. Mediator's disclosure of conflicts of interest« Background.
(1) Before accepting a mediation, an individual who is requested to serve as a mediator
shall:
(a) make an inquiry that is reasonable under the circumstances to determine whether
there are any known facts that a reasonable individual would consider likely to affect the
impartiality of the mediator, including a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the
mediation and an existing or past relationship with a mediation party or foreseeable participant in
the mediation; and
(b) disclose any known fact to the mediation parties as soon as practical before accepting
a mediation.
(2) If a mediator learns any fact described in Subsection (l)(a) after accepting a
mediation, the mediator shall disclose it as soon as practicable.
(3) At the request of a mediation party, an individual who is requested to serve as a
mediator shall disclose the mediator's qualifications to mediate a dispute.
(4) Subsections (1), (2), (3), and (6) do not apply to an individual acting as a judge or
ombudsman.
(5) This chapter does not require that a mediator have a special qualification by
background or profession.
(6) A mediator must be impartial, unless after disclosure of the facts required in
Subsections (1) and (2) to be disclosed, the parties agree otherwise.
78-31c-110. Participation in mediation.
An attorney or other individual designated by a party may accompany the party to, and
participate in, a mediation. A waiver of participation given before the mediation may be
rescinded.
78-31c-lll. International commercial mediation.
(1) In this section:
(a) "International commercial mediation" means an international commercial conciliation
as defined in Article 1 of the Model Law.
(b) "Model Law" means the Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation
adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 28 June 2002 and
recommended by the United Nations General Assembly in a resolution (A/RES/57/18) dated 19
November 2002.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (3) and (4), if a mediation is an
international commercial mediation, the mediation is governed by the Model Law.
(3) Unless the parties agree in accordance with Subsection 78-31c-103(3) that all or part
of an international commercial mediation is not privileged, Sections 78-31c-104 through
78-31c-106 and any applicable definitions in Section 78-31c-102 of this chapter apply to the
mediation and nothing in Article 10 of the Model Law derogates from Sections 78-31c-104
through 78-31c-106.
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(4) If the parties to an international commercial mediation agree under Article 1, Section
(7), of the Model Law that the Model Law does not apply, this chapter applies.
78-31c-112. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act.
This chapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq., but does not modify, limit, or
supersede Section 101(c) of that act or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices
described in Section 103(b) of that act.
78-31c-113. Uniformity of application and construction.
In applying and construing this chapter, consideration should be given to the need to
promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.
78-31c-114. Application to existing agreements or referrals.
(1) This chapter governs a mediation pursuant to a referral or an agreement to mediate
made on or after May 1, 2006.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), on or after May 1, 2007, this chapter governs all
agreements to mediate whenever made.
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SECTION 3. SCOPE.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or (c), this [Act] applies to a
mediation in which:
(1) the mediation parties are required to mediate by statute or court or
administrative agency rule or referred to mediation by a court, administrative agency, or
arbitrator;
(2) the mediation parties and the mediator agree to mediate in a record that
demonstrates an expectation that mediation communications will be privileged against
disclosure; or
(3) the mediation parties use as a mediator an individual who holds
himself or herself out as a mediator or the mediation is provided by a person that holds itself out
as providing mediation.
(b) The [Act] does not apply to a mediation:
(1) relating to the establishment, negotiation, administration, or
termination of a collective bargaining relationship;
(2) relating to a dispute that is pending under or is part of the processes
established by a collective bargaining agreement, except that the [Act] applies to a mediation
arising out of a dispute that has been filed with an administrative agency or court;
(3) conducted by a judge who might make a ruling on the case; or
(4) conducted under the auspices of:
(A) a primary or secondary school if all the parties are students or
(B) a correctional institution for youths if all the parties are
residents of that institution.
(c) If the parties agree in advance in a signed record, or a record of proceeding
reflects agreement by the parties, that all or part of a mediation is not privileged, the privileges
under Sections 4 through 6 do not apply to the mediation or part agreed upon. However,
Sections 4 through 6 apply to a mediation communication made by a person that has not received
actual notice of the agreement before the communication is made.
Legislative Note: To the extent that the Act applies to mediations conducted under the authority
of a State's courts, State judiciaries should consider enacting conforming court rules.
7
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Comment
1. In general.
The Act is broad in its coverage of mediation, a departure from the common state statutes
that apply to mediation in particular contexts, such as court-connected mediation or community
mediation, or to the mediation of particular types of disputes, such as worker's compensation or
civil rights. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 48-168 (1993) (worker's compensation); Iowa
Code Section 216.15A (1999) (civil rights). Moreover, unlike many mediation privileges, it also
applies in some contexts in which the Rules of Evidence are not consistently followed, such as
administrative hearings and arbitration.
Whether the Act in fact applies is a crucial issue because it determines not only the
application of the mediation privilege but also whether the mediator has the obligations
regarding the disclosure of conflicts of interest and, if asked, qualifications in Section 9; is
prohibited from making disclosures about the mediation to courts, agencies and investigative
authorities in Section 7; and must accommodate requirements regarding accompanying
individuals in Section 10.
Because of the breadth of the Act's coverage, it is important to delineate its scope with
precision. Section 3(a) sets forth three different mechanisms that trigger the Act's coverage, and
will likely cover most mediation situations that commonly arise. Section 3(b) on the other hand,
carves out a series of narrow and specific exemptions from the Act's coverage. Finally, Section
3(c) provides a vehicle through which parties who would be mediating in a context covered by
Section 3(a) may "opt out" of the Act's protections and responsibilities. The central operating
principle throughout this Section is that the Act should support, and guide, the parties' reasonable
expectations about whether the mediations in which they are participating are included within
the scope of the Act.
2. Section 3(a). Mediations covered by Act; triggering mechanisms.
Section 3(a) sets forth three conditions, the satisfaction of any one of which will trigger
the application of the Act. This triggering requirement is necessary because the many different
forms, contexts, and practices of mediation and other methods of dispute resolution make it
sometimes difficult to know with certainty whether one is engaged in a mediation or some other
dispute resolution or prevention process that employs mediation and related principles. See, e.g.,
Ellen J. Waxman & Howard Gadlin, Ombudsmen: A Buffer Between Institutions, Individuals, 4
Disp. Resol. Mag. 21 (Summer 1998) (describing functions of ombuds, which can at times
include mediation concepts and skills); Janice Fleischer & Zena Zumeta, Group Facilitation: A
Way to Address Problems Collaboratively, 4 Disp. Resol. Mag.. 4 (Summer 1998) (comparing
post-dispute mediation with pre-dispute facilitation); Lindsay "Peter" White, Partnering:
Agreeing to Work Together on Problems, 4 Disp. Resol. Mag. 18 (Summer 1998) (describing a
common collaborative problem solving technique used in the construction industry). This
problem is exacerbated by the fact that unlike other professionals - such as doctors, lawyers, and
social workers - mediators are not licensed and the process they conduct is informal. If the intent
8
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to mediate is not clear, even a casual discussion over a backyard fence might later be deemed to
have been a mediation, unfairly surprising those involved and frustrating the reasonable
expectations of the parties. The first triggering mechanism, Section 3(a)(1), subject to exceptions
provided in 3(b), covers those situations in which mediation parties are either required to
mediate or referred to mediation by governmental institutions or by an arbitrator. Administrative
agencies include those public agencies with the authority to prescribe rules and regulations to
administer a statute, as well as the authority to adjudicate matters arising under such a statute.
They include agricultural departments, child protective services, civil rights commissions and
worker's compensation boards, to name only a few. Through this triggering mechanism, the
formal court-referred mediation that many people associate with mediation is clearly covered by
the Act.
Where Section 3(a)(1) focuses on publicly referred mediations, the second triggering
mechanism, Section 3(a)(2), furthers party autonomy by allowing mediation parties and the
mediator to trigger the Act by agreeing to mediate in a record that is signed by the parties and by
the mediator. A later note by one party that they agreed to mediate would not constitute a record
of an agreement to mediate. In addition, the record must demonstrate the expectation of the
mediation parties and the mediator that the mediation communications will have a privilege
against disclosure.
Yet significantly, these individuals are not required to use any magic words to obtain the
protection of the Act. See Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co., 577 N.W.2d 927
(Minn. 1998). The lack of a requirement for magic words tracks the intent to be inclusive and to
embrace the many different approaches to mediation. Moreover, were magic words required,
party and mediator expectations of confidentiality under the Act might be frustrated, since a
mediation would only be covered by the Act if the institution remembered to include them in any
agreement.
The phrase "privileged against disclosure" clarifies the type of expectations that the
record must demonstrate tin order to show an expectation of confidentiality in a subsequent legal
setting. Mere generalized expectations of confidentiality in a non-legal setting are not enough to
trigger the Act if the case does not fit under Sections 3(a)(1) or 3(a)(3). Take for example a
dispute in a university between the heads of the Spanish and Latin departments that is mediated
or "worked out informally" with the assistance of the head of the French department, at the
suggestion of the university provost. Such a mediation would not reasonably carry with it party
or mediator expectations that the mediation would be conducted pursuant to an evidentiary
privilege, rights of disclosure and accompaniment and the other protections and obligations of
the Act. Indeed, some of the parties and the mediator may more reasonably expect that the
mediation results, and even the underlying discussions, would be disclosed to the university
provost, and perhaps communicated throughout the parties' respective departments and
elsewhere on campus. By contrast, however, if the university has a written policy regarding the
mediation of disputes that embraces the Act, and the mediation is specifically conducted
pursuant to that policy, and the parties agree to participate in mediation in a record signed by the
parties, then the parties would reasonably expect that the Act would apply and conduct
themselves accordingly, both in the mediation and beyond.
9
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The third triggering mechanism, Section 3(a)(3), focuses on individuals and
organizations that provide mediation services and provides that the Act applies when the
mediation is conducted by one who is held out as a mediator. For example, disputing neighbors
who mediate with a volunteer at a community mediation center would be covered by the Act,
since the center holds itself out as providing mediation services. Similarly, mediations conducted
by a private mediator who advertises his or her services as a mediator would also be covered,
since the private mediator holds himself or herself out to the public as a mediator. Because the
mediator is publicly held out as a mediator, the parties may reasonably expect mediations they
conduct to be conducted pursuant to relevant law, specifically the Act. By including those
mediations conducted by private mediators who hold themselves out as mediators, the Act tracks
similar doctrines regarding other professions. In other contexts, "holding out" has included
making a representation in a public manner of being in the business or having another person
make that representation. See 18A Am. Jur.2d Corporations Section 271 (1985).
Mediations can be conducted by ombuds practitioners. See Standards for the
Establishment and Operation of Ombuds Offices (August 2001). If such a mediation is
conducted pursuant to one of these triggering mechanisms, such as a written agreement under
Section 3(a)(2), it will be protected under the terms of the Act. There is no intent by the Drafters
to exclude or include mediations conducted by an ombuds a priori. The terms of the Act
determine applicability, not a mediator's formal title.
Finally, on the issue of Section 3(a) inclusions into the Act, the Drafting Committees
discussed whether it should cover the many cultural and religious practices that are similar to
mediation and that use a person similar to the mediator, as defined in this Act. On the one hand,
many of these cultural and religious practices, like more traditional mediation, streamline and
resolve conflicts, while solving problems and restoring relationships. Some examples of these
practices are Ho'oponopono, circle ceremonies, family conferencing, and pastoral or marital
counseling. These cultural and religious practices bring richness to the quality of life and
contribute to traditional mediation. On the other hand, there are instances in which the
application of the Act to these practices would be disruptive of the practices and therefore
undesirable. On balance, furthering the principle of self-determination, the Drafting Committees
decided that those involved should make the choice to be covered by the Act in those instances
in which other definitional requirements of Section 2 are met by entering into an agreement to
mediate reflected by a record or securing a court or agency referral pursuant to Section 3(a)(1).
At the same time, these persons could opt out the Act's coverage by not using this triggering
mechanism. This leaves a great deal of leeway, appropriately, with those involved in the
practices.
3. Section 3(b)(1) and (2). Exclusion of collective bargaining disputes.
Collective bargaining disputes are excluded because of the longstanding, solidified, and
substantially uniform mediation systems that already are in place in the collective bargaining
context. See Memorandum from ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law of the American
Bar Association to Uniform Mediation Act Reporters 2 (Jan. 23, 2000) (on file with UMA
Drafting Committees); Letter from New York State Bar Association Labor and Employment
10
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Law Section to Reporters, Uniform Mediation Act 2-4 (Jan. 21, 2000) (on file with UMA
Drafting Committees). This exclusion includes the mediation of disputes arising under the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement, as well as mediations relating to the formation of a
collective bargaining agreement. By contrast, the exclusion does not include employment
discrimination disputes not arising under the collective bargaining agreement as well as
employment disputes arising after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement.
Mediations of disputes in these contexts remain within the protections and responsibilities of the
Act.
4. Section 3(b)(3). Exclusion of certain judicial conferences.
Difficult issues arise in mediations that are conducted by judges during the course of
settlement conferences related to pending litigation, and this Section excludes certain judicially
conducted mediations from the Act. Some have the concern that party autonomy in mediation
may be constrained either by the direct coercion of a judicial officer who may make a subsequent
ruling on the matter, or by the indirect coercive effect that inherently inures from the parties'
knowledge of the ultimate presence of that judge. See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too
Great: Judges Should Not Mediate Cases Assigned to Them For Trial, 6 Disp. Resol. Mag. 11
(Fall 1999), and Frank E.A. Sander, A Friendly Amendment, 6 Disp. Resol. Mag. 11 (Fall 1999).
This concern is further complicated by the variegated nature of judicial settlement
conferences. As a general matter, judicial settlement conferences are typically conducted under
court or procedural rules that are similar to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
have come to include a wide variety of functions, from simple case management to a venue for
court-ordered mediations. See Mont. R. Civ. P., Rule 16(a). In situations in which a part of the
function of judicial conferences is case management, the parties hardly have an expectation of
confidentiality in the proceedings, even though there may be settlement discussions initiated or
facilitated by the judge or judicial officer. In fact, such hearings frequently lead to court orders
on discovery and issues limitations that are entered into the public record. In such circumstances,
the policy rationales supporting the confidentiality privilege and other provisions of the Act are
not furthered.
On the other hand, there are judicially-hosted settlement conferences that for all practical
purposes are mediation sessions for which the Act's policies of promoting full and frank
discussions between the parties would be furthered. See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting
Settlement Conferences: Effectiveness in the Judicial Role, 3 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1
(1987); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 485 (1985).
The Act recognizes the tension created by this wide variety of settlement functions by
drawing a line with regard to those conferences that are covered by the Act and those that are not
covered by the Act. The Act excludes those settlement conferences in which information from
the mediation is communicated to a judge with responsibility for the case. This is consistent with
the prohibition on mediator reports to courts in Section 7. The term "judge" in Section 3(b)(3)
includes magistrates, special masters, referees, and any other persons responsible for making
11
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rulings or recommendations on the case. However, the Act does not apply to a court mediator, or
a mediator who contracts or volunteers to mediate cases for a court because they may not make
later rulings on the case. Similarly mediations conducted by judges specifically and exclusively
are assigned to mediate cases, so-called "buddy judges," and retired judges who return to
mediate cases do not fall within the Section 3(b)(3) exemption because such mediators do not
make later rulings on the case.
Local rules are usually not recognized beyond the court's jurisdiction, and may not
provide assurance of confidentiality if the mediation communications are sought in andther
jurisdiction, and if the jurisdiction does not permit recognize privilege by local rule.
5. Section 3(b)(4)(A). Exclusion of peer mediation.
The Act also exempts mediations between students conducted under the auspices of
school programs because the supervisory needs of schools toward students, particularly in peer
mediation, may not be consistent with the confidentiality provisions of the Act. For example,
school administrators need to be able to respond to, and in a proceeding verify, legitimate threats
to student safety or domestic violence that may surface during a mediation between students. See
Memorandum from ABA Section of Dispute Resolution to Uniform Mediation Act Reporters
(Nov. 15, 1999) (on file with UMA Drafting Committees). The law has "repeatedly emphasized
the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials,
consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the
schools." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969), citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390,402(1923).
This exemption does not include mediations involving a teacher, parent, or other nonstudent as such an exemption might preclude coverage of truancy mediation and other mediation
sessions for which the privilege is pertinent.
6. Section 3(b)(4)(B). Exclusion of correctional institutions for youth.
The Act also exempts programs involving youths at correctional institutions if the
mediation parties are all residents of the institution. This is to facilitate and encourage mediation
and conflict prevention and resolution techniques among those juveniles who have welldocumented and profound needs in those areas. Kristina H. Chung, Kids Behind Bars: The
Legality of Incarcerating Juveniles in Adult Jails, 66 Ind. L.J. 999, 1021 (1991). Exempting
these programs serves the same policies as are served by the peer mediation exclusion for nonincarcerated youths. The Drafters do not intend to exclude cases where at least one party is not a
resident, such as a class action suit against a non-resident in which the parties mediate or attempt
to mediate the case.
7. Section 3(c). Alternative of non-privileged mediation.
This Section allows the parties to opt for a non-privileged mediation or mediation session
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by mutual agreement, and furthers the Act's policy of party self-determination. If the parties so
agree, the privilege sections of the Act do not apply, thus fulfilling the parties reasonable
expectations regarding the confidentiality of that mediation or session. For example, parties in a
sophisticated commercial mediation, who are represented by counsel, may see no need for a
privilege to attach to a mediation or session, and may by express written agreement "opt out" of
the Act's privilege provisions. Similarly, parties may also use this option if they wish to rely on,
and therefore use in evidence, statements made during the mediation. It is the parties rather than
the mediator who make this choice, although a mediator could presumably refuse to mediate a
mediation or session that is not covered by this Act. Even if the parties do not agree in advance,
the parties, mediator, and all nonparty participants can waive the privilege pursuant to Section 5.
In this instance, however, the mediator and other participants can block the waiver in some
respects.
If the parties want to opt out, they should inform the mediators or nonparty participants
of this agreement, because without actual notice, the privileges of the Act still apply to the
mediation communications of the persons who have not been so informed until such notice is
actually received. Thus, for example, if a nonparty participant has not received notice that the
opt-out has been invoked, and speaks during a mediation, that mediation communication is
privileged under the Act. If, however, one of the parties or the mediator tells the nonparty
participant that the opt-out has been invoked, the privilege no longer attaches to statements made
after the actual notice has been provided, even though the earlier statements remain privileged
because of the lack of notice.
8. Other scope issues.
The Act would apply to all mediations that fit the definitions of mediation by a mediator
unless specifically excluded by the State adopting the Act. For example, a State may want to
exclude international commercial conciliation, which is covered by specific statute in some
States. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 1-567.60 (1991); Cal. Civ. Pro. Section 1297.401 (West
1988); Fla. Stat. Ann. Section 684.10 (1986).
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really a mediation that would privilege those communications in a later criminal or civil case.
This Section should be read together with Section 6(a)(4), which applies to particular
communications within a mediation which are used for the same purposes. The two differ on the
purpose of the mediation: Section 5(c) applies when the mediation itself is used to further a
crime, while Section 6(a)(4) applies to matters that are being mediated for other purposes but
which include discussion of acts or statements that may be deemed criminal in nature. Under
Section 5(c), the preclusion applies to all mediation communications because the purpose of the
mediation frustrates public policy. Under Section 6(a)(4), the preclusion only applies to those
mediation communications that have a criminal character; the privilege may still be asserted to
block the introduction of other communications made during the mediation. This rationale is
discussed more fully in the comments to Section 6(a)(4).

SECTION 6. EXCEPTIONS TO PRIVILEGE.
(a) There is no privilege under Section 4 for a mediation communication that is:
(1) in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the
agreement;
(2) available to the public under [insert statutory reference to open records
act] or made during a session of a mediation which is open, or is required by law to be open, to
the public;
(3) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a
crime of violence;
(4) intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit or commit a
crime, or to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity;
(5) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of
professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator;
(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), sought or offered to
prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a
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mediation party, nonparty participant, or representative of a party based on conduct occurring
during a mediation; or
(7) sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect, abandonment, or
exploitation in a proceeding in which a child or adult protective services agency is a party, unless
the
[Alternative A: [State to insert, for example, child or adult
protection] case is referred by a court to mediation and a public agency participates.]
[Alternative B: public agency participates in the [State to insert,
for example, child or adult protection] mediation].
(b) There is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative agency, or
arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of
the evidence has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available, that there is a need for the
evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and that the
mediation communication is sought or offered in:
(1) a court proceeding involving a felony [or misdemeanor]; or
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a proceeding to prove a
claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the
mediation.
(c) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication
referred to in subsection (a)(6) or (b)(2).
(d) If a mediation communication is not privileged under subsection (a) or (b), only the
portion of the communication necessary for the application of the exception from nondisclosure
may be admitted. Admission of evidence under subsection (a) or (b) does not render the
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evidence, or any other mediation communication, discoverable or admissible for any other
purpose.
Legislative Note: If the enacting state does not have an open records act, the following
language in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) needs to be deleted: "available to the public under
[insert statutory reference to open records act] or".
Comment
1. In general.
This Section articulates specific and exclusive exceptions to the broad grant of privilege
provided to mediation communications in Section 4. As with other privileges, when it is
necessary to consider evidence in order to determine if an exception applies, the Act
contemplates that a court will hold an in camera proceeding at which the claim for exemption
from the privilege can be confidentially asserted and defended. See, e.g., Rinaker v. Superior
Court, 74 CaL Rptr.2d 464, 466 (Ct. App. 1998); Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F.Supp.2d
1110, 1131-33 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (discussing whether an in camera hearing is necessary).
The exceptions in Section 6(a) apply regardless of the need for the evidence because
society's interest in the information contained in the mediation communications may be said to
categorically outweigh its interest in the confidentiality of mediation communications. In
contrast, the exceptions under Section 6(b) would apply only in situations where the relative
strengths of society's interest in a mediation communication and mediation participant interest in
confidentiality can only be measured under the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
The Act places the burden on the proponent of the evidence to persuade the court in a non-public
hearing that the evidence is not otherwise available, that the need for the evidence substantially
outweighs the confidentiality interests and that the evidence comes within one of the exceptions
listed under Section 6(b). In other words, the exceptions listed in 6(b) include situations that
should remain confidential but for overriding concerns for justice.
2. Section 6(a)(1). Record of an agreement.
This exception would permit evidence of a signed agreement, such as an agreement to
mediate, an agreement regarding how the mediation should be conducted ~ including whether
the parties and mediator may disclose outside of proceedings, or, more commonly, written
agreements memorializing the parties' resolution of the dispute. The exception permits such an
agreement to be introduced in a subsequent court proceeding convened to determine whether the
terms of that settlement agreement had been breached.
The words "agreement evidenced by a record" and "signed" refer to written and executed
agreements, those recorded by tape recorded and ascribed to by the parties on the tape, and other
electronic means to record and sign, as defined in Sections 2(9) and 2(10). In other words, a
participant's notes about an oral agreement would not be a signed agreement. On the other hand,
25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the following situations would be considered a signed agreement: a handwritten agreement that
the parties have signed, an e-mail exchange between the parties in which they agree to particular
provisions, and a tape recording in which they state what constitutes their agreement.
Written agreements are commonly excepted from mediation confidentiality protections,
permitting the Act to embrace current practices in a majority of States. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
Section 12-2238 (1993); Cal. Evid. Code Section 1120(1) (West 1997) (general); Cal. Evid.
Code Section 1123 (West 1997) (general); Cal. Gov't. Code Section 12980(i) (West 1998)
(housing discrimination); Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 24-34-506.5 (1993) (housing discrimination);
Ga. Code Ann. Section 45-19-36(e) (1989) (fair employment); 775 111. Comp. Stat. Section 5/7B102(E)(3) (1989) (human rights); Ind. Code Section 679.2 (1998) (general); Iowa. Code Ann.
Section 216.15(B) (1999) (civil rights); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 344.200(4) (1996) (civil
rights); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 9:4112(B)(1)(c) (1997) (general); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
Section 51:2257(D) (1998) (human rights); 5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 4612(1)(A) (1995)
(human rights); Md. Code 1957 Ann. Art. 49(B) Section 28 (1991) (human rights); Mass. Gen.
Laws. ch. 151B, Section 5 (1991) (job discrimination); Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 213.077 (1992)
(human rights); Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 43-2908 (1993) (parenting act); N.J. Stat. Ann. Section
10:5-14 (1992) (civil rights); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 36.220(2)(a) (1997) (general); Or. Rev.
Stat. Ann. 36.262 (1989) (agricultural foreclosure); 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. Section 5949(b)(1)
(1996) (general); Tenn. Code Ann. Section 4-21-303(d) (1996) (human rights); Tex. Gov't. Code
Ann. Section 2008.057 (1999) (Administrative Procedure Act); Vt. R. Civ. P., Rule 16.3 (1998)
(general civil); Va. Code Ann. Section 8.01-576.10 (1994) (general); Va. Code Ann. Section
8.01-581.22 ( 1988) (general); Wash. Rev. Code Section 5.60.070 (l)(e) and (f) (1993) ( 1993)
(general); Wash. Rev. Code Section 26.09.015(3) (1991) (divorce); Wash. Rev. Code Section
49.60.240 (1995) (human rights); W.Va. Code Section 5-11 A-11(b)(4) (1992) (fair housing);
W.Va. Code Section 6B-2-4(r) (1990) (public employees); Wis. Stat. Section 767.11(12) (1993)
(family court); Wis. Stat. Section 904.085(4)(a) (1997) (general).
This exception is noteworthy only for what is not included: oral agreements. The
disadvantage of exempting oral settlements is that nearly everything said during a mediation
session could bear on either whether the parties came to an agreement or the content of the
agreement. In other words, an exception for oral agreements has the potential to swallow the rule
of privilege. As a result, mediation participants might be less candid, not knowing v/hether a
controversy later would erupt over an oral agreement. Unfortunately, excluding evidence of oral
settlements reached during a mediation session would operate to the disadvantage of a less
legally sophisticated party who is accustomed to the enforcement of oral settlements reached in
negotiations. Such a person might also mistakenly assume the admissibility of evidence of oral
settlements reached in mediation as well. However, because the majority of courts and statutes
limit the confidentiality exception to signed written agreements, one would expect that mediators
and others will soon incorporate knowledge of a writing requirement into their practices. See
Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d 805 (Ind., 2000) (citing draft Uniform Mediation Act); Ryan v.
Garcia, 27 Cal. App.4th 1006, 1012 (1994) (privilege statute precluded evidence of oral
agreement); Hudson v. Hudson, 600 So.2d 7,9 (Fla. App. 1992) (privilege statute precluded
evidence of oral settlement); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section 2317.023 (West 1996). For an
example of a state statute permitting the enforcement of oral agreements under certain narrow
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circumstances, see Cal. Evid. Code Section 1118, 1124 (West 1997) (providing that oral
agreement must be memorialized in writing within 72 hours).
Despite the limitation on oral agreements, the Act leaves parties other means to preserve
the agreement quickly. For example, parties can agree that the mediation has ended, state their
oral agreement into the tape recorder and record their assent. See Regents of the University of
California v. Sumner, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1209, 1212 (1996). This approach was codified in Cal.
Evid. Code Section 1118, 1124 (West 1997).
The parties may still provide that particular settlements agreements are confidential with
regard to disclosure to the general public, and provide for sanctions for the party who discloses
voluntarily. See Stephen A. Hochman, Confidentiality in Mediation: A Trap for the Unwary,
SB41 ALI-ABA 605 (1995). However, confidentiality agreements reached in mediation, like
those in other settlement situations, are subject to the need for evidence and public policy
considerations. See Cole et al., supra, Section 9.23, 9.25.
3. Section 6(a)(2). Mediations open to the public; meetings and records made open
by law.
Section 6(a)(2) makes clear that the privileges in Section 4 do not preempt state open
meetings and open records laws, thus deferring to the policies of the individual States regarding
the types of meetings that will be subject to these laws. In addition, it provides an exception
when the mediation is opened to the public, such as a televised mediation.
This exception recognizes that there should be no after-the-fact confidentiality for
communications that were made in a meeting that was either voluntarily open to the public such as a workgroup meeting in a federal negotiated rule making that was made open to the
general public, even though not required by Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) to be
open - or was required to be open to the public pursuant to an open meeting law. For example,
the Act would provide no privilege if an agency holds a closed meeting but FACA would require
that it be open. This exception also applies if a meeting was properly closed but an open record
law requires that the meeting summaries or other documents - perhaps even a transcript - be
made available under certain circumstances, e.g. the Federal Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C. 552b
(1995). In this situation, only the records would be excepted from the privilege, however.
4. Section 6(a)(3). Threats of bodily injury or to commit a crime of violence.
The policy rationales supporting the privilege do not support mediation communications
that threaten bodily injury or crimes of violence. To the contrary, in cases in which a credible
threat has been made disclosure would serve the public interest in safety and the protection of
others. Because such statements are sometimes made in anger with no intention to commit the
act, the exception is a narrow one that applies only to the threatening statements; the remainder
of the mediation communication remains protected against disclosure.
State mediation confidentiality statutes frequently recognize a similar exception. See
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Alaska Stat. Section 47.12.450(e) (1998) (community dispute resolution centers) (admissible to
extent relevant to a criminal matter); Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 13-22-307 (1998) (general) (bodily
injury); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 23-605(b)(5) (1999) (domestic relations) (mediator may report
threats of violence to court); Or. Rev. Stat. Section 36.220(6) (1997) (general) (substantial bodily
injury to specific person); 42 Pa. Cons. St. Ann. Section 5949(2)(1) (1996) (general) (threats of
bodily injury); Wash. Rev. Code Section 7.75.050 (1984) (community dispute resolution centers)
(threats of bodily injury); Wyo. Stat. Section 1-43-103 (c)(ii) (1991) (general) (future crime or
harmful act).
5. Section 6(a)(4). Communications used to plan or commit a crime.
The policies underlying this provision mirror those underlying Section 5(c), and are
discussed there. This exception applies to particular communications used to plan or commit a
crime, whereas Section 5(c) applies when the mediation is used for these purposes. It includes
communication intentionally used to conceal an ongoing crime or criminal activity.
Almost a dozen States currently have mediation confidentiality protections that contain
exceptions related to a commission of a crime. Colo. Rev Stat. Section 13-22-307 (1991)
(general) (future felony); Fla. Stat. Ann. Section 723.038 (mobile home parks) (ongoing or future
crime or fraud); Iowa Code Section 216.15B (1999) (civil rights); Iowa Code Section 654A.13
(1990) (farmer-lender); Iowa Code Section 679C.2 (1998) (general) (ongoing or future crimes);
Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 23-605(b)(3) (1989) (ongoing and future crime or fraud); Kan. Stat.
Ann. Section 44-817(c)(3) (1996) (labor) (ongoing and future crime or fraud); Kan. Stat. Ann.
Section 75-4332(d)(3) (1996) (public employment) (ongoing and future crime or fraud); 24 Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 2857(2) (1999) (health care) (to prove fraud during mediation); Minn.
Stat. Section 595.02(l)(a) (1996) (general); Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 25-2914 (1994) (general)
(crime or fraud); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 328-C:9(Ill) (1998) (domestic relations) (perjury
in mediation); N.J. Stat Ann. Section 34:13A-16(h) (1997) (workers' compensation) (any crime);
N.Y. Lab. Laws Section 702-a(5) (McKinney 1991) (past crimes) (labor mediation); Or. Rev.
Stat. Ann. Section 36.220(6) (1997) (general) (future bodily harm to a specific person); S.D.
Codified Laws Section 19-13-32 (1998) (general) (crime or fraud); Wyo. Stat. Ann. Section 1 43-103(c)(ii) (1991) (future crime).
While ready to exempt attempts to commit or the commission of crimes from
confidentiality protection, the Drafting Committees declined to cover "fraud" that would not also
constitute a crime because civil cases frequently include allegations of fraud, with varying
degrees of merit, and the mediation would appropriately focus on discussion of fraud claims.
Some state statutes do exempt fraud, although less frequently than they do crime. See, e.g., Fla.
Stat. Ann. Section 723.038(8) (1994) (mobile home parks) (communications made in furtherance
of commission of crime or fraud); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 23-605(b)(3) (1999) (domestic
relations) (ongoing crime or fraud); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 44-817(c)(3) (1996) (labor)
(ongoing crime or fraud); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 60-452(b)(3) (1964) (general) (ongoing or
future crime or fraud); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 75-4332(d)(3) (1996) (public employment)
(ongoing or future crime or fraud); Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 25-2914 (1994) (general) (crime or
fraud); S.D. Codified Laws Section 19-13-32 (1998) (general) (crime or fraud).
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Significantly, this exception does not cover mediation communications constituting
admissions of past crimes, or past potential crimes, which remain privileged. Thus, for example,
discussions of past aggressive positions with regard to taxation or other matters of regulatory
compliance in commercial mediations remain privileged against possible use in subsequent or
simultaneous civil proceedings. The Drafting Committees discussed the possibility of creating an
exception for the related circumstance in which a party makes an admission of past conduct that
portends future bad conduct. However, they decided against such an expansion of this exception
because such past conduct can already be disclosed in other important ways. The other parties
can warn others, because parties are not prohibited from disclosing by the Act. The Act permits
the mediator to disclose if required by law to disclose felonies or if public policy requires.
It is important to emphasize that the Act's limited focus as an evidentiary and discovery
privilege, rather than a broader rule of confidentiality means that this privilege provision would
not prevent a party from calling the police, or warning someone in danger.
Finally, it should be noted that this exception is intended to prevent the abuse of the
privilege as a shield to evidence that might be necessary to prosecute or defend a crime. The
Drafters recognize that it is possible that the exception itself could be abused. Such unethical or
bad faith conduct would continue to be subject to traditional sanction standards.
6. Section 6(a)(5). Evidence of professional misconduct or malpractice by the
mediator.
The rationale behind the exception is that disclosures may be necessary to promote
accountability of mediators by allowing for grievances to be brought against mediators, and as a
matter of fundamental fairness, to permit the mediator to defend against such a claim. Moreover,
permitting complaints against the mediator furthers the central rationale that States have used to
reject the traditional basis of licensure and credentialing for assuring quality in professional
practice: that private actions will serve an adequate regulatory function and sift out incompetent
or unethical providers through liability and the rejection of service. See, e.g., W. Lee Dobbins,
The Debate Over Mediator Qualifications: Can They Satisfy the Growing Need to Measure
Competence Without Barring Entry into the Market?, U. Fla. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 95, 96-98
(1995).
7. Section 6(a)(6). Evidence of professional misconduct or malpractice by a party or
representative of a party.
Sometimes the issue arises whether anyone may provide evidence of professional
misconduct or malpractice occurring during the mediation. See In re Waller, 573 A.2d 780 (D.C.
App. 1990); see generally Pamela Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The
Intolerable Conflict for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation
Confidentiality and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 715,
740-751. The failure to provide an exception for such evidence would mean that lawyers and
fiduciaries could act unethically or in violation of standards without concern that evidence of the
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misconduct would later be admissible in a proceeding brought for recourse. This exception
makes it possible to use testimony of anyone except the mediator in proceedings at which such a
claim is made or defended. Because of the potential adverse impact on a mediator's appearance
of impartiality, the use of mediator testimony is more guarded, and therefore protected by
Section 6(c). It is important to note that evidence fitting this exception would still be protected in
other types of proceedings, such as those related to the dispute being mediated.
Reporting requirements operate independently of the privilege and this exception.
Mediators and other are not precluded by the Act from reporting misconduct to an agency or
tribunal other than one that might make a ruling on the dispute being mediated, which is
precluded by Section 8(a) and (b).
8. Section 6(a)(7). Evidence of abuse or neglect.
An exception for child abuse and neglect is common in domestic mediation
confidentiality statutes, and the Act reaffirms these important policy choices States have made to
protect their citizens. See, e.g., Iowa. Code Ann. Section 679c.3(4) (1998) (general); Kan. Stat.
Ann. Section 23-605(b)(2) (1999) (domestic relations); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 38-1522(a)
(1997) (general); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 44-817© )(2) (1996) (labor); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section
72-5427(e)(2) (1996) (teachers); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 75-4332(d)(l) (1996) (public
employment); Minn. Stat. Ann. Section 595.02(2)(a)(5) (1996) (general); Mont. Code Ann.
Section 41-3-404 (1999) (child abuse investigations) (mediator may not be compelled to testify);
Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 43-2908 (1993) (parenting act) (in camera); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section
328-C:9(IIl)(c ) (1998) (marital); N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 7A-38.1(L) (1999) (superior court);
N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 7A-38.4(K) (1999) (district courts); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section
3109.052(c) (West 1990) (child custody); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section 5123.601 (West 1988)
(mental retardation); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section 2317.02 (1998) (general); Or. Rev. Stat.
Section 36.220(5) (1997) (general); Tenn. Code Ann. Section 36-4-130(b)(5) (1993) (divorce);
Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-38(4) (2000) (divorce) (mediator shall report); Va. Code Ann.
Section 63.1-248.3(A)(10) (2000) (welfare); Wis. Stat. Section 48.981(2) (1997) (social
services): Wis. Stat. Section 904.085(4)(d) (1997) (general); Wyo. Stat. Section l-43-103(c)(iii)
(1991) (general). But see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 8-807(B) (West 1998) (child abuse
investigations) (rejecting rule of disclosure).
By referring to "child and adult protective services agency," the exception broadens the
coverage to include the elderly and disabled if that State has protected them by statute and has
created an agency enforcement process. It should be stressed that this exception applies only to
permit disclosures in public agency proceedings in which the agency is a party or nonparty
participant. The exception does not apply in private actions, such as divorce, because the need
for the evidence is not as great as in proceedings brought to protect against abuse and neglect so
that the harm can be stopped, and is outweighed by the policy of promoting candor during
mediation. For example, in a mediation between Husband and Wife who are seeking a divorce,
Husband admits to sexually abusing a child. Husband's admission would not be privileged in an
action brought by the public agency to protect the child, but would be privileged in the divorce
hearings.
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The last bracketed phrases make an exception to the exception to privilege of mediation
communications in certain mediations involving such public agencies. Child protection agencies
in many States have created mediation programs to resolve issues that arise because of
allegations of abuse. Those advocating the use of mediation in these contexts point to the need
for privilege to promote the use of the process, and these alternatives provide it. National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Resource Guidelines: Improving the Child Abuse
and Neglect Court Process, 1995. These alternatives are bracketed and offered to the states as
recommended model provisions because of concerns raised by some mediators of such cases that
mediator testimony sometimes can be necessary and appropriate to secure the safety of a
vulnerable party in a situation of abuse. See Letter from American Bar Association Commission
on Mental and Physical Disability Law, November 15, 2000 (on file with Drafting Committees).
The words "child or adult protection" are bracketed so that States using a different term
or encouraging mediation of disputes arising from abuse of other protected classes can add
appropriate language.
Each state may chose to enact either Alternative A or Alternative B. The Alternative A
exception only applies to cases referred by the court or public agency. In this situation,
allegations already have been made in an official context and a court has made the determination
that settlement of that case is in the public interest by referring it to mediation. In Alternative B
exception, no court referral is required. A state enacting Alternative B would be adopting a
policy that it is sufficient that the public agency favors settlement of a particular case by its
participation in the mediation.
The term "public agency" may have to be modified in a State in which a private agency is
charged by law to assume the duties to protect children in these contexts.
9. Section 6(b). Exceptions requiring demonstration of need.
The exceptions under this Section constitute less common fact patterns that may
sometimes justify carving an exception, but only when the unique facts and circumstances of the
case demonstrate that the evidence is otherwise unavailable, and the need for the evidence
outweighs the policies underlying the privilege. Thus, Section 6(b) effectively places the burden
on the proponent to persuade the court on these points. The evidence will not be disclosed absent
a finding on these points after an in camera hearing. Further, under Section 6(d) the evidence
will be admitted only for that limited purpose.
10. Section 6(b)(1). Felony [and misdemeanors].
As noted in the commentary to Section 6, point 5, the Act affords more specialized
treatment for the use of mediation communications in subsequent felony proceedings, which
reflects the unique character, considerations, and concerns that attend the need for evidence in
the criminal process. States may also wish to extend this specialized treatment to misdemeanors,
and the Drafters offer appropriate model language for states in that event.
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Existing privilege statutes are silent or split as to whether they apply only to civil
proceedings, apply also to some juvenile or misdemeanor proceedings, or apply as well to all
criminal proceedings. The split among the States reflects clashing policy interests. One the one
hand, mediation participants operating under the benefit of a privilege might reasonably expect
that statements made in mediation would not be available for use in a later felony prosecution.
The candor this expectation promotes is precisely that which the mediation privilege seeks to
protect. It is also the basis upon which many criminal courts throughout the country have
established victim-offender mediation programs, which have enjoyed great success in
misdemeanor, and, increasingly, felony cases. See generally Nancy Hirshman, Mediating
Misdemeanors: Big Successes in Smaller Cases, 7 Disp. Resol Mag. 12 (Fall 2000); Mark S.
Umbreit, The Handbook of Victim Offender Mediation (2001). Public policy, for example,
specifically supports the mediation of gang disputes, and these programs may be less successful
if the parties cannot discuss the criminal acts underlying the disputes. Cal. Penal Code Section
13826.6 (West 1996) (mediation of gang-related disputes); Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 22-25-104.5
(1994) (mediation of gang-related disputes).
On the other hand, society's need for evidence to avoid an inaccurate decision is greatest
in the criminal context - both for evidence that might convict the guilty and exonerate the
innocent — because the stakes of human liberty and public safety are at their zenith. For this
reason, even without this exception, the courts can be expected to weigh heavily the need for the
evidence in a particular case, and sometimes will rule that the defendant's constitutional rights
require disclosure. See Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 466 (Ct. App. 1998)
(juvenile's constitutional right to confrontation in civil juvenile delinquency trumps mediator's
statutory right not to be called as a witness); State v. Castellano, 460 So.2d 480 (Fla. App. 1984)
(statute excluding evidence of an offer of compromise presented to prove liability or absence of
liability for a claim or its value does not preclude mediator from testifying in a criminal
proceeding regarding alleged threat made by one party to another in mediation). See also Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
After great consideration and public comment, the Drafting Committees decided to leave
the critical balancing of these competing interests to the sound discretion of the courts to
determine under the facts and circumstances of each case. It is drafted in a manner to ensure that
both the prosecution and the defense have the same right with respect to evidence, thus assuring
a level playing field. In addition, it puts the parties on notice of this limitation on confidentiality.
11. Section 6(b)(2). Validity and enforceability of settlement agreement
This exception is designed to preserve traditional contract defenses to the enforcement of
the mediated settlement agreement that relate to the integrity of the mediation process, which
otherwise would be unavailable if based on mediation communications. A recent Texas case
provides an example. An action was brought to enforce a mediated settlement. The defendant
raised the defense of duress and sought to introduce evidence that he had asked the mediator to
permit him to leave because of chest pains and a history of heart trouble, and that the mediator
had refused to let him leave the mediation session. See Randle v. Mid Gulf Inc., No. 14-9532
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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01292, 1996 WL 447954 (Tex App. 1996) (unpublished). The exception might also allow party
testimony in a personal injury case that the driver denied having insurance, causing the plaintiff
to rely and settle on that basis, where such a misstatement would be a basis for reforming or
avoiding liability under the settlement. Under this exception the evidence will not be privileged
if the weighing requirements are met. This exception differs from the exception for a record of
an agreement in Section 6(a)(1) in that Section 6(a)(1) only exempts the admissibility of the
record of the agreement itself, while the exception in Section 6(b)(2) is broader in that it would
permit the admissibility of other mediation communications that are necessary to establish or
refute a defense to the validity of a mediated settlement agreement.
12. Section 6(c). Mediator not compelled.
Section 6(c) allows the mediator to decline to testify or otherwise provide evidence in a
professional misconduct and mediated settlement enforcement cases to protect against frequent
attempts to use the mediator as a tie-breaking witness, which would undermine the integrity of
the mediation process and the impartiality of the individual mediator. Nonetheless, the parties
and others may testify or provide evidence in such cases.
This Section is discussed in the comments to Sections 6(a)(7) and 6(b)(2). The mediator
may still testify voluntarily if the exceptions apply, or the parties waive their privilege, but the
mediator may not be compelled to do so.
13. Section 6(d). Limitations on exceptions.
This Section makes clear the limited use that may be made of mediation communications
that are admitted under the exceptions delineated in Sections 6(a) and 6(b). For example, if a
statement evidencing child abuse is admitted at a proceeding to protect the child, the rest of the
mediation communications remain privileged for that proceeding, and the statement of abuse
itself remains privileged for the pending divorce or other proceedings.

SECTION 7. PROHIBITED MEDIATOR REPORTS.
(a) Except as required in subsection (b), a mediator may not make a report, assessment,
evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding a mediation to a court,
administrative agency, or other authority that may make a ruling on the dispute that is the subject
of the mediation.
(b) A mediator may disclose:
(1) whether the mediation occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement was
33
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H
Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai
Conn.Super.,2006.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.
Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of
Litchfield.
SHARON MOTOR LODGE, INC. et al.
v.
Allan Y. TAI.
No. CV980077828S.
March 1,2006.
Background: Corporate client and its officers sued
attorney for legal malpractice. After plaintiffs filed
a motion for judgment on the settlement in the
amount of $365,000 plus interest and motion for
determination was granted to the extent that it
allowed the parties to direct two interrogatories to
the mediator, plaintiffs filed motion for an order to
permit them to take deposition and/or testimony of
mediator as to issues presented in counts added in
amended complaint.

Holdings: The Superior Court, Judicial District of
Litchfield, Bozzuto, J., held that:

Motion granted.
West Headnotes
[1] Courts 106 €==>99(5)
106 Courts
106II Establishment,
Organization, and
Procedure
10611(G) Rules of Decision
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case
as Law of the Case
106k99(5) k. Trial or Evidence,
Rulings Relating To. Most Cited Cases
Superior court would decline to treat its previous
determinations regarding whether parties could
introduce testimony of mediator into evidence as
the law of the case relative to present motion of
corporate client and its officers to depose mediator
as to issues presented in counts added in amended
complaint; new and overriding circumstances
existed in that client and officers were previously
seeking to summarily enforce settlement agreement,
which required them to provide evidence that terms
of agreement were clear and unambiguous, while
existence of agreement was put at issue by
allegations that law firm breached settlement
agreement.
[2] Witnesses 410 €==>196.4

(1) previous determinations regarding whether
parties could introduce testimony of mediator into
evidence would not be treated as the law of the case
relative to present motion to depose mediator;
(2) subpoena duces tecum that law firm filed
approximately four years earlier did not satisfy
requirements
of
statute
providing
that
communications
during
a
mediation
were
discoverable if parties agreed in writing to
disclosure; and
(3) interest of justice outweighed the need for
confidentiality of mediation proceedings.

410 Witnesses
41 Oil Competency
41011(D)
Confidential
Relations
and
Privileged Communications
410k 196 Fiduciary or Contract Relations
in General
410k 196.4 k. Other Miscellaneous
Relations. Most Cited Cases
Subpoena duces tecum that law firm filed
approximately four years earlier was too remote in
time to the proposed disclosure to satisfy
requirements
of
statute
providing
that
communications received or obtained during a
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mediation were discoverable if parties agreed in
writing to disclosure. C.G.S.A. § 52-235d(b)(l).
[3] Witnesses 410 €=^196.4
410 Witnesses
41 Oil Competency
41011(D)
Confidential
Relations
and
Privileged Communications
410k 196 Fiduciary or Contract Relations
in General
410k 196.4 k. Other Miscellaneous
Relations. Most Cited Cases
Interest of justice, arising from client's substantial
need to elicit testimony of mediator to obtain
evidence relating essential elements of claim that
law
firm
breached
settlement
agreement,
outweighed the need for confidentiality of
mediation proceedings that resulted in settlement.
C.G.S.A. § 52-235d(b)(4).

Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, Torrington, Gallagher Law
Firm, New Haven, and Ouellette Deganis &
Gallagher LLC, Cheshire, for Sharon Motor Lodge,
Inc.
Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, Torrington, for Yoke Kiew
Chau and Chia Peng Chiang.
Michael William Coffey, Wilson Elser, White
Plains, for Allan Y. Tai.BOZZUTO, J.

1
*1 The above-referenced case is, in part, a legal
malpractice action. The issue presently before the
court is whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to
take the deposition of or elicit the testimony from
the judge magistrate who conducted confidential
mediation sessions between the parties relative to
the original malpractice action. The purpose of
eliciting testimony from the mediator is to
determine whether he believed that a settlement
agreement between the parties had been achieved
during the course of the mediation sessions. For the
reasons set forth below, the court grants the
plaintiffs motion.

II

Conn. L. Rptr. 852

In 1998, the plaintiffs, Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc.
and its two officers, Yoke Kiew Chau and Chia
Peng Chiang, commenced this action against the
defendant, Allan Y. Tai, an attorney who
represented them in the purchase of the Sharon
Motor Lodge. In their complaint the plaintiffs allege
that, after they purchased the motor lodge, it
sustained physical damage as a result of flooding,
and that the defendant committed malpractice by
failing to conduct a title search that would have
included an inquiry into whether the property was
located in a flood zone, in failing to recommend
that they obtain a professional inspection of the
septic system and pool on the premises, and by not
disclosing that he was not licensed to practice in
Connecticut and was not knowledgeable as to
Connecticut real estate law and procedures.
The record reveals that after litigation began, the
parties entered into non-binding mediation in which
United States Magistrate Judge Owen Eagan acted
as the mediator. The parties signed a confidentiality
agreement, as they were required to do in order to
enter into the mediation. The pctrties disagree as to
whether the defendant's attorney was authorized to
settle the case, and if so, for what amount. The
plaintiffs allege that the defendant's attorney
represented that he had authority to settle, and that,
at the second mediation session, on May 23, 2001,
the parties reached a settlement in the amount of
$365,000. The defendant disagrees, contending that
his attorney did not have authority to enter into a
settlement on behalf of his malpractice insurance
carrier and that, therefore, the parties did not reach
a settlement.
On July 13, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
judgment on the settlement in the amount of
$365,000 plus interest. In August 2001, they filed a
motion for determination in which they asked the
court to determine whether an agreement had been
reached, and sought the disclosure of the results of
the mediation sessions from the mediator. The court
granted the motion for determination on December
3, 2001, to the extent that it allowed the parties to
direct two interrogatories to the mediator. Sharon
Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, Superior Court, judicial
district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 98 0077828
(December 3, 2001, Cremins, J.) (30 Conn. L. Rptr.
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753,
755). The
mediator
answered
the
interrogatories, indicating that he thought the parties
had reached an agreement to settle the case for
$365,000. An evidentiary hearing followed on May
16, 2002, in which the defendant argued that the
mediator's understanding of the settlement was the
result of a miscommunication, and both the
defendant's attorney and a representative of his
malpractice insurance carrier denied that they had
reached a settlement with the plaintiffs.
*2 On June 25, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a motion
asking the court to order the mediator to testify. The
court, Cremins, J., denied both the plaintiffs' motion
for judgment and their motion to order the
testimony of the mediator. As to the former, the
court ruled that it would not enforce the terms of the
alleged settlement agreement because of the
disagreement over its existence. The plaintiffs
appealed the trial court's decisions on these
motions. The Appellate Court found that the trial
court's ruling on the motion for judgment was not a
final judgment and, therefore, dismissed the appeal.
Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, 82 Conn.App.
148, 842 A.2d 1140, cert, denied, 269 Conn. 908,
852A.2d738(2004). FN1

FN1. Because the Appellate Court
concluded that the trial court's denial of the
plaintiffs' motion for judgment was not a
final judgment, it did not reach the
plaintiffs' claim that the trial court
improperly denied their motion to compel
the mediator to testify. Sharon Motor
Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 82 Conn.App. at
152 n. 5,842 A.2d 1140.
Meanwhile, on July 16, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a
request to amend their initial complaint to add five
counts in which they allege that the parties reached
a settlement agreement and the defendant breached
the agreement. The defendant filed an objection to
the request to amend, which was overruled by the
court, Pickard, J.
On October 17, 2005, the plaintiffs filed the motion
that is presently before the court, i.e, a motion for
an order to permit them to take the deposition

and/or testimony of the mediator as to the issues
presented in the counts that they added in the
amended complaint. The plaintiffs contend that the
mediator's testimony is relevant, material and
probative as to the issues, is permitted by the
exceptions outlined in General Statutes § 52-235d(b)
, and that the interest of justice calls for this order
so that the court may utilize all rational means for
ascertaining the truth. The defendant objects to the
motion on the ground that the information that the
plaintiffs seek is not discoverable under § 52-235d.

Ill
[1] The first issue is whether the doctrine of the law
of the case is implicated in the court's consideration
of the present motion. As previously noted, in 2001,
the plaintiffs filed a motion for determination in
which they asked the court to permit them to obtain
disclosure of the results of the mediation from the
mediator on the grounds that such disclosure was
warranted under § 52-235d(b)(2), (3) and (4). The
defendant opposed the motion on policy grounds
and on the ground that the statutory exceptions
upon which the plaintiffs relied did not apply. The
court, noting that case law interpreting the statute
was "sparse," engaged in its own statutory
interpretation. Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai,
supra, 30 Conn. L. Rptr. at 754. The court
concluded that "pursuant to § 52-235d(b)(4) ... in
the interest of justice, the need for the disclosure of
relevant
communications
made during the
mediation outweighs the parties' need for
confidentiality in order to determine whether a
settlement agreement was reached at the mediation."
Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 30 Conn.
L. Rptr. at 755. The court granted the motion to the
extent that it permitted the plaintiffs to direct two
interrogatories to the mediator. Id.™2

FN2. Specifically, the court stated: "The
plaintiffs' motion for determination is
granted limited to the submission of the
following interrogatories to the Honorable
F. Owen Eagan:
(1) Is it your understanding that the parties
in the matter of Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc.
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et al. v. Allan Y. Tai, mediated before you
on April 12, 2001 and on May 23, 2001
reached an agreement ending their lawsuit.
Yes
No
(2) If the answer to question (1) is yes,
what was your understanding as to the
terms of the settlement agreement."
*3 The mediator responded to the interrogatories,
indicating that he understood that the parties had
reached a settlement. Nevertheless, the defendant
continued to maintain that they had not. The
plaintiffs then filed a motion asking the court to
order the mediator to testify. The court, Cremins, J.,
denied the motion without issuing a written decision
thereon. The court then denied the plaintiffs' motion
for judgment on the settlement on the basis that the
parties disagreed as to whether they had reached a
settlement. The plaintiffs appealed both decisions.
Although the Appellate Court did not reach the
issue of whether the trial court properly denied the
motion to order the mediator to testify, it did
discuss the trial court's order, noting that the trial
court "had to decide, in its discretion, whether
further disclosure by the mediator [beyond the two
interrogatories] was required 'as a result of
circumstances' and whether the 'interest of justice
outweighs the need for confidentiality, consistent
with the principles of law/ General Statutes §
52-235d(b)(4). The court, at a hearing, was able to
discern the circumstances of the alleged settlement
and could assess the credibility of the testimony
proffered. The court found that the testimony of the
mediator should not be ordered." Sharon Motor
Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 82 Conn.App. at 160, 842
A.2d 1140. The Appellate Court also stated that, in
denying the order, the trial court "impliedly [found]
that 'as a result of the circumstances,' it did not
find lthat the interest of justice outweighs the need
for confidentiality' of the mediator's testimony.
General Statutes § 52-235d(b)(4)." Sharon Motor
Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 82 Conn.App. at 153, 842
A.2d 1140. Thus, this court has twice determined, at
least by implication, that the mediator should not be
ordered to testify under the "interest of justice"
exception of § 52-235d(b)(4).
Under the doctrine of the law of the case, "[w]here
a matter has previously been ruled upon

interlocutorily, the court in a subsequent proceeding
in the case may treat that decision as the law of the
case, if it is of the opinion that the issue was
correctly decided, in the absence of some new or
overriding circumstance." Breen v. Phelps, 186
Conn. 86, 99, 439 A.2d 1066 (1982). Under this
doctrine, absent "new or overriding circumstances"
the court has the discretion to treat its earlier
decisions on the same issue in the matter as the law
of the case. Wasko v. Manella, 87 Conn.App. 390,
396, 865 A.2d 1223 (2005). On the other hand, if
new or overriding circumstances do exist, the court
should consider a party's subsequent motions
pertaining to an issue that it has previously
considered. Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., Inc.,
259 Conn. 114, 131, 788 A.2d 83 (2002).
In the present matter, new and overriding
circumstances exist in that the plaintiffs were
previously seeking to summarily enforce the
settlement agreement, which required them to
provide evidence that the terms of the agreement
were "clear and unambiguous." Audubon Parking
Associates, Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs,
Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 811, 626 A.2d 729 (1993).
Since that time, the plaintiffs have amended their
complaint to include allegations that the defendant
breached the settlement agreement, and the
defendant has filed an answer denying these
allegations. Therefore, the existence of the
agreement is at issue.
*4 Moreover, in their previous motions, the
plaintiffs asked the court to order the mediator to
testify and "to admit evidence from the mediation ...
" Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 30 Conn.
L. Rptr. at 754. In the present motion, they seek the
court's permission to depose the mediator "as to the
limited issues presented by trial of Counts 3-7 of the
Plaintiffs' amended complaint." As the Supreme
Court has noted, "[e]vidence may be elicited at a
discovery deposition even though 'the information
sought will be inadmissible at trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.'
Practice Book § 218 [now § 13-2]. Thus the
allowable scope of inquiry at a discovery deposition
clearly exceeds the boundaries of admissible
evidence." Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises,
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Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 139,491 A.2d 389 (1985).
Given the new circumstances, this court declines to
treat the trial court's previous determinations
regarding whether the parties can introduce the
testimony of the mediator into evidence as the law
of the case relative to the plaintiffs' present motion
to depose the mediator.
"Our rules of practice provide guidelines to
facilitate the discovery of information relevant to a
pending suit." Sanderson v. Steve Snyder
Enterprises, Inc., supra, 196 Conn, at 139, 491
A.2d 389. Practice Book § 13-2 defines the scope
of discovery as follows: "In any civil action ...
where the judicial authority finds it reasonably
probable that evidence outside the record will be
required, a party may obtain in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter discovery of information ..
. material to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, which [is] not privileged, whether
the discovery or disclosure relates to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party, and which [is]
within the knowledge, possession or power of the ...
person to whom the discovery is addressed.
Discovery shall be permitted if the disclosure
sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or
defense of the action and it can be provided by the
disclosing ... person with substantially greater
facility than it could otherwise be obtained by the
party seeking disclosure. It shall not be ground for
objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence ..."
Our Supreme Court "[has] long recognized that the
granting or denial of a discovery request rests in the
sound discretion of the [trial] court ..." (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Olson v. Accessory
Controls & Equipment Corp., 254 Conn. 145, 156,
757 A.2d 14 (2000). "That discretion is limited,
however, by the provisions of the rules pertaining to
discovery; Practice Book §§ 217-21 [now §§ 13-2
to 13-5]; especially the mandatory provision that
discovery 'shall be permitted if the disclosure
sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or
defense of the action ...' (Emphasis added.) Practice

Book § 218 [now § 13-2]. The court's discretion
applies to decisions concerning whether the
information is material [or] privileged ... as stated in
[§ 13-2]. A complete denial of discovery, however,
is seldom within the court's discretion unless the
court finds that one or more of the limitations on
discovery expressed above applies." Standard
Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 57-60, 459
A.2d 503 (1983).
*5 One category of information that is generally
exempt, or privileged, from being discovered is
information regarding non-court-ordered mediation.
General Statutes § 52-235d, which governs this
issue, provides in relevant part: "(b) Except as
provided in this section, by agreement of the
parties, or in furtherance of settlement discussions,
a person not affiliated with either party to a lawsuit,
an attorney for one of the parties or any other
participant in a mediation shall not voluntarily
disclose or, through discovery or compulsory
process, be required to disclose any oral or written
communication received or obtained during the
course of a mediation, unless (1) each of the parties
agrees in writing to such disclosure, (2) the
disclosure is necessary to enforce a written
agreement that came out of the mediation, (3) the
disclosure is required by statute or regulation, or by
any court, after notice to all parties to the
mediation, or (4) the disclosure is required as a
result of circumstances in which a court finds that
the interest of justice outweighs the need for
confidentiality, consistent with the principles of law.
"(c) Any disclosure made in violation of any
provision of this section shall not be admissible in
any proceeding."
"(d) Nothing in this section shall prevent (1) the
discovery or admissibility of any evidence that is
otherwise discoverable merely because such
evidence was presented during the course of the
mediation ..."
The plaintiffs argue that the court should grant their
motion for the following reasons: 1) the mediator's
testimony is required in that the interest of justice
calls for his testimony under the common law, and
this interest outweighs the need for confidentiality,
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as provided for in § 52-23 5d(b)(4); 2) the
mediator's testimony is relevant material and
probative on the issue of whether there was a
settlement and, if so, what the terms of that
settlement were; and 3) both parties have agreed in
writing to the disclosure, as provided in §
52-235d(b)(l) in that both parties have, at different
times, sought to compel the mediator's testimony.
The defendant opposes the motion on the grounds
that requiring the mediator's testimony would
violate the principles of confidentiality and his
testimony is not discoverable under any of the
exceptions provided for in § 52-235d(b).
Little guidance exists in Connecticut case law as to
the use of the statutory privilege contained in §
52-235d(b) or the exceptions thereto. Our Supreme
and Appellate Courts have not addressed this
precise issue. Although judges of this court and the
federal district court have done so, the decisions in
which they addressed these issues are not instructive
as to the scope of the privilege or the exceptions. FN3
As such, this court has closely analyzed the
subject statute in an effort to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature.

FN3. In Moore v. Lieberman, Superior
Court, judicial district of Middlesex at
Middletown, Docket No. CV 98 0087620
(April 23, 2001, Gilardi, J.), the court, in
rendering a decision on the plaintiffs
motion to summarily enforce a settlement
agreement, considered documents that had
been received or obtained during the
course of mediation. In response to the
defendants' argument that § 52-23 5d
prohibited the court from considering the
documents, the court found that they had
waived the statutory protection by
submitting the documents to the court and
that "in the interests of justice, [the] court's
need for the materials outweighs the
parties' need for confidentiality in order to
determine
whether
an
unambiguous
settlement agreement exists." Moore v.
Lieberman, supra, Superior Court, Docket
No. CV 98 0087620, n. 4. In making its
determination, however, the court did not

further explore or articulate the reasons
that contributed to its decision. Id.
Therefore, Moore is of little assistance in
determining the contours of the relevant
exception.
In New Horizon Financial Services, LLC
v. First Financial Equities, Inc., 278
F.Sup.2d 259, 263 (D.Conn.2003), in
which the plaintiff sought summary
enforcement of a settlement agreement, the
federal district court granted the plaintiffs
request to call the mediator to testify at an
evidentiary hearing. The court relied on
this court's decision granting the plaintiffs'
motion for determination, see Sharon
Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 30 Conn.
L. Rptr. at 753, and concluded that "
pursuant to § 52-235d(b)(4), 'disclosure is
required as a result of circumstances in
which a court finds that the interest of
justice
outweighs
the
need
for
confidentiality,
consistent
with
the
principles of law' ..." New Horizon
Financial Services, LLC v. First Financial
Equities, Inc., supra, 278 F.Supp. at 263.
The court did not, however, detail the
reasons that led to its determination.
Therefore,
New
Horizon
Financial
Services, LLC, does not provide guidance
as to the issue presented here.
"In undertaking this analysis, we are mindful that,
as with any claim of privilege, a statutory privilege
has the effect of withholding relevant information
from the factfinder ... Accordingly, although a
statutory privilege must be applied so as to
effectuate its purpose, it is to be applied cautiously
and with circumspection because it impedes the
truth-seeking function of the adjudicative process."
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Babcock v. Bridgeport Hospital, 251
Conn. 790, 819, 742 A.2d 322 (1999) (discussing
statutory privileges accorded to certain medical
records).
*6 "It is well settled that in construing statutes, [the
court's] fundamental objective is to ascertain and
give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ...
and that 4[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first
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instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute
itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after
examining such text and considering such
relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or
unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the
meaning of the statute shall not be considered.'
General Statutes § l-2z." (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Alexson v. Foss, 276 Conn. 599, 604-05,
887 A.2d 872 (2006). "The test to determine
ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in
context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Alexson v. Foss, supra, 276 Conn, at 605, 887 A.2d
872.

communications received or obtained during a
mediation is discoverable if the parties agree in
writing to the disclosure. It is reasonable to
conclude that, given the general intent of the statute,
this exception applies to previously undisclosed
communications if the parties expressly agree to the
disclosure and their agreement is reasonably near in
time to the proposed disclosure.FN4 Here, the
written document that the plaintiffs rely on is a
subpoena duces tecum that the defendant filed
approximately four years ago. This document does
not satisfy the requirements of this exception
because it is too remote in time to the proposed
disclosure.

Previously in this case, in deciding the plaintiffs'
motion for determination, the court engaged in a
statutory interpretation of § 52-235d(b) and
concluded that its purpose was to ensure the
confidentiality of the alternative dispute resolution
proceedings
involved
in
non-court-ordered
mediation. Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra,
30 Conn. L. Rptr. at 754. This conclusion is
consistent with both the plain language of the
statute and its legislative history. See 41 H.R. Proc,
Pt. 5, 1998 Sess., p. 1425, remarks of
Representative Michael P. Lawlor ("[tjhis bill
simply clarifies that voluntary disclosure made
during the course of a mediation which is not court
ordered is not subject to further disclosure in court.
In other words, it allows for confidential mediations
to take place"). It is also consistent with the theory
that provisions for ensuring the confidentiality of
alternative dispute resolution proceedings will
encourage parties to use these measures. See State
Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom oj
information Commission, 244 Conn. 487, 500, 709
A.2d 1129 (1999) ("requiring proceedings before
the mediation board to be open to the public would
create a significant deterrent to parties considering
arbitration before the mediation board. This, in turn,
would work to defeat the legislature's goal of
providing low cost arbitration services as an
effective alternative to private arbitrators to
facilitate the resolution of labor disputes").

FN4. See Section 5(a) of the Uniform
Mediation Act, which provides in relevant
part: "A privilege [of confidentiality of
mediation
communications]
may
be
waived in a record or orally during a
proceeding if it is expressly waived by all
parties to the mediation and: (1) in the case
of the privilege of the mediator, it is
expressly waived by the mediator ..."
National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, Uniform Mediation
Act, Section 5(a), "Waiver and Preclusion
of Privilege." (2003). As the reporter
comments,
"[significantly
...
the
mediation privilege does not permit waiver
to be implied by conduct ... The rationale
for requiring explicit waiver is to
safeguard against the possibility of
inadvertent waiver ..." Id, comment 1.

[2] Turning to the first exception at issue, the plain
language of § 52-235d(b)(l) provides that

*7 [3] As to the other exception that the plaintiffs
rely upon, i.e., § 52-235d(b)(4), its language is plain
and unambiguous to the extent that it does not,
unlike mediation confidentiality provisions in other
jurisdictions, categorically bar a party from
obtaining the testimony of a mediator. See, e.g.,
Cal. Evid.Code § 703.5 (except in very limited
circumstances, "no ... mediator ... shall be
competent to testify, in any subsequent civil
proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, decision,
or ruling, occurring at or in conjunction with the
prior proceeding").
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More to the point, however, the language of the
statute is not plain and unambiguous in that it does
not provide guidance for determining the
circumstance in which "the interest of justice" will
outweigh "the need for confidentiality, consistent
with the principles of law." The plaintiffs'
contention, that such circumstances exist where, as
in the present case, the matter before the court
involves claims that are premised upon allegations
that the defendant agreed to a settlement in the
course of the mediation and then breached the
agreement is reasonable, but so is the defendant's
argument that allowing for disclosures in such
circumstances might undermine the policy of
encouraging parties to engage in alternative dispute
resolution. In order to determine the parameters of
this exception, the court will "look for interpretive
guidance
to
the
legislative
history
and
circumstances surrounding [the statute's] enactment,
to the legislative policy it was designed to
implement, and to its relationship to existing
legislation and common law principles governing
the same general subject matter ..." (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Cogan v. Manhattan
Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 7, 882 A.2d
597 (2005).
First, and again as previously noted in this case, the
legislative history of § 52-235d(b) does not clarify
the intent of the legislature in crafting the
exceptions contained therein. Sharon Motor Lodge,
Inc. v. Tai, supra, 30 Conn. L. Rptr. at 754. To the
extent that the general intent of the statute is to "
[preserve] the candidness of discussions that take
place during mediation and [to maintain] the
integrity and confidentiality of the mediation process
"; id., at 753; its intent is similar to the policies
underlying the attorney-client and attorney work
product privileges.™5 See National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Mediation Act (Uniform Mediation Act), Section 4 "
Privilege
Against
Disclosure;
Admissibility;
Discovery," Reporter's Comment 4(a)(2), (2003) ("
the mediation privilege of the parties draws upon
the purpose, rationale, and traditions of the
attorney-client privilege, in that its paramount
justification is to encourage candor by the
mediation parties, just as encouraging the client's
candor is the central justification of the

attorney-client privilege"). See also Alford v.
Bryant,
137
S.W.3d
916921-22
(Tex.Civ.App.2004), cert, denied, 2005 Tex.
LEXIS 375 (Tex.2005) (privilege accorded
confidential mediation communications analyzed in
accordance
with
standards
applicable
to
attorney-client privilege).

FN5. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 249 Conn.
36,
52,
730
A.2d
51
(1999)
(attorney-client
privilege "created to
encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in
the observation of law and administration
of justice" [internal quotation marks
omitted] ); and Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 510-11, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed.
451 (1947) (work product privilege
premised on policy that "it is essential that
a lawyer work with a certain degree of
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion
by opposing parties and their counsel ...
[Absent the privilege]
[inefficiency,
unfairness and sharp practices would
inevitably develop in the giving of legal
advice and in the preparation of cases for
trial ... And the interests of the clients and
the cause of justice would be poorly served.
").
*8 When § 52-235d(b) is considered in conjunction
with these privileges, the exception recognized in §
52-235d(b)(4) appears to be similar to the "at issue"
exception to the privilege that is accorded to
attorney-client communications under common law
and to the "substantial need" exception to the
privilege accorded to attorney work product under
Practice Book § 13-3(a). The parameters of these
exceptions, therefore, provide guidance in deciding
the scope of § 52-235d(b)(4).FN6

FN6. The exception recognized in §
52-235d(b)(4) is also similar to § 4-8 of
the Connecticut Code of Evidence, which
provides: "(a) General rule. Evidence of an
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offer to compromise or settle a disputed
claim is inadmissable on the issues of
liability and the amount of the claim, (b)
Exceptions. This rule does not require the
exclusion of: (1) Evidence that is offered
for another purpose, such as proving bias
or prejudice of a witness ... or (2)
statements of fact or admissions of liability
made by a party." Although, as a court in
another
jurisdiction
noted,
"[t]he
confidentiality
protections
of
[the
mediation confidentiality
statute] are
broader than the exclusionary rule set forth
in rule [4-8] ... similar policy concerns
underlie both provisions." Avary v. Bank
of America, N.A., 72 S.W.3d 779, 798
(Tex.Civ.App.2002),
cert.
denied,
(Tex.2003). Like the mediation privilege,
the general rule that evidence of attempts
to settle an action is not admissible "
reflects the strong public policy of
promoting settlement of disputes." Miko v.
Commission
on
Human
Rights &
Opportunities, 220 Conn. 192, 209, 596
A.2d 396 (1991).
Indeed, in his motion to strike the
plaintiffs' claims relating to the settlement
agreement, the defendant argued that
evidence regarding these claims is
inadmissible pursuant to § 4-8(a). As the
court noted in denying the defendant's
motion, "[t]his ground is not well-founded.
The five counts all allege that an actual
agreement was reached. The evidence to
which the defendant objects will not be
offered for the purpose of establishing
liability in the case in chief or on the issue
of the amount of the claim. Evidence will
be offered on the issue of whether the
parties reached an enforceable agreement
to settle their claim ... The essential issue
in the five new counts is ... breach of
contract. Proof of these counts will be by
the normal fair preponderance of the
evidence. Section 4-8(a) does not preclude
the prosecution of these counts." Sharon
Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, Superior Court,
judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No.
CV 98 0077828 (December 14, 2004,

Conn. L. Rptr. 852

Pickard, J.).
Generally, "[exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege should be made only when the reason for
disclosure outweighs the potential chilling of
essential communications." Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 249 Conn. 36,
52, 730 A.2d 51 (1999). Specifically, "[b]ecause of
the important public policy considerations that
necessitated the creation of the attorney-client
privilege, the 'at issue/ or implied waiver,
exception is invoked only when the content of the
legal advice is integral to the outcome of the legal
claims of the action ... Such is the case when a party
specifically pleads reliance on an attorney's advice
as an element of a claim or defense ... or
specifically places at issue, in some other manner,
the attorney-client relationship. In those instances
the party has waived the right to confidentiality by
placing the content of the attorney's advice directly
at issue because the issue cannot be determined
without an examination of that advice." (Citation
omitted; emphasis added.) Id., at 52-53, 730 A.2d 51
FN7

FN7. The court cautioned that "[m]erely
because the communications are relevant
does not
place
them
at
issue."
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 249 Conn,
at 54, 730 A.2d 51. In addition, u[w]hen
privileged communications are not at issue,
the opposing party cannot destroy the
attorney-client
privilege
by
merely
claiming a need for the documents. It
would be inconsistent with the nature and
purpose of the [attorney-client] privilege to
make an exception to the privilege based
only on the unavailability of information
from other sources." (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id, at 56-57, 730 A.2d 51.
As to the attorney work product privilege, Practice
Book § 13-3(a), provides that "a party may obtain
discovery of documents and tangible things
otherwise discoverable under Section 13-2 and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by
or for another party or by or for that other party's
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supra, 25 Conn. L. Rptr. at 80. As to the second
element, "[c]ourts have found undue hardship when
a witness is unable to recall information contained
in work product or is no longer available, or if the
cost to obtain the equivalent information is
unusually high." Id. Overall, "the inquiry ... is
whether the necessity for the plaintiff to discover
these materials outweighs the ... right to immunity
from discovery." Cloutier v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield,
Docket No. CV 90 0278184 (March 6, 1998,
Mottolese, J.) (21 Conn. L. Rptr. 472, 474), affd
per curiam, 60 Conn.App. 904, 759 A.2d 1056,
cert, denied, 255 Conn. 919, 763 A.2d 1040 (2000).

representative only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of the case and is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means. In ordering discovery of such materials
when the required showing has been made, the
judicial authority shall not order disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a
party concerning the litigation." FN8

FN8. Despite the seemingly absolute
nature of the privilege as it pertains to u
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
and legal theories of an attorney," our
courts have determined that such materials
may be discovered if they are "essential to
the party's claim" and "could never be
obtained by the [party] through any other
legitimate means." Cloutier v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial
district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 90
0278184 (March 6, 1998, Mottolese, J.)
(21 Conn. L. Rptr. 472, 474), affd per
curiam, 60 Conn.App. 904, 759 A.2d 1056,
cert, denied, 255 Conn. 919, 763 A.2d
1040(2000).

FN9. "Work product can be defined as the
result of an attorney's activities when those
activities have been conducted with a view
to pending or anticipated litigation."
(Internal
quotation
marks
omitted.)
Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 714, 647
A.2d 324 (1994).
*9 Applying these standards to § 52-235d(b)(4), a
party that seeks the disclosure of privileged
mediation communications can obtain such material
on the basis that disclosure is required in that "the
interest of justice outweighs the need for
confidentiality" if the party shows that it has a
substantial need for the materials, i.e., that the
materials are essential to its claims or defenses, that
it would suffer undue hardship if the materials were
not disclosed, and that these two considerations
outweigh the interests
of preserving the
confidentiality of the communications. This
standard balances "the public interest in protecting
the confidentiality of the settlement process and
countervailing interests, such as the right to every
person's evidence." In re Anonymous, 283 P.3d
627, 637 (4th Cir.2002).

"Once a party has demonstrated that the material
sought is work product, FN9 then the party seeking
discovery has to make the requisite showing of both
substantial need and undue hardship to obtain
disclosure." Garcia v. Yale New Haven Hospital,
Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven,
Docket No. CV 95 0373032 (July 2, 1999, Lager,
J.) (25 Conn. L. Rptr. 78, 79). " 'Substantial need'
is established if the information contained in the
documents is essential to the movant for example by
containing the essential elements of a prima facie
case, [6] J. Moore's Federal Practice ... § 26.70[5]
[c] [3d ed.1997], or by containing facts that
demonstrate the opposing party's knowledge. There
is no substantial need when the documents contain
material that is merely helpful but not essential ... or
there are alternative means available to the movant
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
information." Garcia v. Yale New Haven Hospital,

It is noteworthy that courts in other jurisdictions
have applied similar standards in deciding whether
information disclosed in mediation sessions is
subject to disclosure. See id. (disclosure not
allowed "unless the party seeking such disclosure
can demonstrate that 'manifest injustice' will result
from non-disclosure ... Application of the ...
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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standard requires the party seeking disclosure to
demonstrate that the harm caused by non-disclosure
will be manifestly greater than the harm caused by
disclosure."); and State v. Williams, 184 N.J. 432,
452-53, 877 A.2d 1258 (2005) (disclosure not
allowed unless need for disclosure outweighs
interest in protecting confidentiality, i.e., disclosure
necessary to prove claim and evidence not
otherwise available).™10

FN 10. In addition, the most recent version
of the Uniform Mediation Act provides an
exception to the confidentiality
of
mediation communications "if a court ...
finds, after a hearing in camera, that the
party seeking discovery ... has shown that
the evidence is not otherwise available,
that there is a need for the evidence that
substantially outweighs the interest in
protecting confidentiality, and that the
mediation communication is sought ... in ...
a proceeding to prove a claim to rescind or
reform or a defense to avoid liability on a
contract arising out of the mediation."
Uniform Mediation Act supra, Section 6, "
Exceptions to Privilege."
In order to determine whether the plaintiffs have a
substantial need for the testimony of the mediator, it
is necessary to review the elements of their claims
that the defendant breached the settlement
agreement. "A settlement agreement is a contract
that is interpreted according to general principles of
contract law ... In Connecticut, a contract is binding
if the parties mutually assent to its terms. Ubysz v.
DiPietro, 185 Conn. 47, 51, 440 A.2d 830, 833
(1981); see Johnson v. Schmitz, 237 F.Sup.2d 183,
189 (D.Conn.2002) (applying this rule to settlement
agreements). When both parties have mutually
assented to a contract, the agreement is binding
even if it is not signed. Schwarzschild v. Martin,
191 Conn. 316, 321-22, 464 A.2d 774, 777 (1983);
see MilI gard Corp. v. White Oak Corp., 224
F.Sup.2d 425, 432 (D.Conn.2002) (applying this
rule to settlement agreements) ." (Citations
omitted.) Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Omega, S.A.,
432 F.3d 437, 443-44 (2d Cir.2005).

On the other hand, "[t]he Connecticut Supreme
Court has held that '[a] contract is not made so long
as, in the contemplation of the parties, something
remains to be done to establish the contractual
relation.' Klein v. Chatfield, 166 Conn. 76, 80, 347
A.2d 58, 61 (1974). The parties' intent is
determined from the (1) language used, (2)
circumstances
surrounding
the
transaction,
including the motives of the parties, and (3)
purposes which they sought to accomplish. Id; see
Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49
Conn.App. 152, 160-61, 714 A.2d 21, 27 [cert,
denied, 247 Conn. 905, 720 A.2d 516] (1998)
(same)." Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Omega, S.A.,
supra, 432 F.3d at 444.
*10 It is arguable that the plaintiffs have a
substantial need to elicit testimony of the mediator
in order to obtain evidence relating to the first two
factors, which are essential to their claims.
Moreover, the question of the validity of the
defendant's assertion that his attorney did not have
the authority to settle the action is at issue, and it is
apparent
that
evidence
regarding
any
representations that the attorney or the parties may
have made to the mediator regarding this issue is
not available from other, unprivileged sources.
In balancing these factors against the interest of
maintaining the confidentiality of mediation
proceedings, it is important to recognize that "[i]f
mediation
confidentiality
is important, the
appearance of mediator impartiality is imperative. A
mediator, although neutral, often takes an active
role in promoting candid dialogue ... To perform
that function, a mediator must be able to instill the
trust and confidence of the participants in the
mediation process. That confidence is insured if the
participants trust that information conveyed to the
mediator will remain in confidence. Neutrality is the
essence of the mediation process ... Thus, courts
should be especially wary of mediator testimony
because no matter how carefully presented, [it] will
inevitably be characterized so as to favor one side
or the other." (Citations omitted; emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Williams, supra, 184 N.J. at 447-48, 877 A.2d 1258.
On the other hand, as another court observed in

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Ori£. U.S. Govt. Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Not Reported in A.2d

Page 12

Not Reported in A.2d, 2006 WL 696320 (Conn.Super.),
(Cite as: Not Reported in A.2d)

Conn. L. Rptr. 852

declining to recognize a mediator p r i v i l e g e , 1 "
[w]hile confidentiality appears to be widely
accepted in state law as a desirable component of
the mediation process, there are legitimate
countervailing interests to be accounted for in
formulating a privilege that is invocable by a
mediator, not the least of which is the venerable l
right to every man's evidence.' " Smith v. Smith,
154 F.R.D. 661, 671 (N.D.Tex. 1994). Furthermore,
"[t]o accept as a given that the process of private
party mediation should take place in confidence is
not of itself sufficient to excuse a mediator from an
obligation of disclosure upon the request of a
disputant. When the question to be resolved is
whether the mediator should have protected status,
the balancing of competing interests will only
properly take place in the context of the mediator,
not of mediation in its broadest sense." Id, at
673-74. In addition, as the court noted, "
[proponents of a mediator privilege must reckon
with the important right of litigants to obtain all
available evidence, a right that arguably is
paramount to some of the interests relied upon to
justify immunizing mediators from compulsory
disclosure." FN12 Id., at 674-75. Accordingly, the
court concluded, u[w]hen a litigant seeks to assert a
privilege not recognized in the common law, the
court must test it by balancing the policies behind
the privilege against those favoring disclosure." Id.

154 F.R.D. at 675.
*11 In the present case, it would not serve the
policy considerations of encouraging settlement by
mediation or the policy favoring disclosure if a
party was able to use mediation proceedings to
engage in behavior that is prejudicial to the rights of
other parties and then use the mediation privilege to
insulate himself or herself from liability. See Avary
v. Bank of America, N.A., 72 S.W.3d 779, 800
(Tex.Civ.App.2002), cert, denied, 2005 Tex.
LEXIS 375 (Tex.2005). Moreover, such conduct is
counter to the policy of ensuring that "agreements
reached during mediation are enforced, thereby
upholding the policy of judicial economy, the very
reason mediation is encouraged." Sharon Motor
Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 30 Conn. L. Rptr. at 753.

IV
In these circumstances, the interest of justice
outweighs the need for confidentiality. The court
grants plaintiffs motion for order # 228. The scope
of the testimony shall be limited to the issues set
forth in counts 3-7 of plaintiffs amended complaint
dated July 16,2001.
SO ORDERED.
Conn.Super.,2006.
Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai
Not Reported in A.2d, 2006 WL
(Conn.Super.), 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 852

FN11. The court noted that, by " '
mediator privilege' the court refers to a
privilege invocable by the mediator, with
or without the consent of a client or other
mediation participant." Smith v. Smith, 154
F.R.D. 661, 670 n. 11 (N.D.Tex. 1994).

END OF DOCUMENT

FN 12. The court added, "certain of the
reasons on which advocates of a mediator
privilege stand are subject to question.
There are those who challenge the validity
of concerns regarding an appearance of
mediator impartiality ... Furthermore, one
can arguably question the validity of
predictions
of
a
shortage
of
mediators-including
able
ones-if
a
mediator privilege is not adopted."
(Citations omitted.) Smith v. Smith, supra,
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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